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LETTERS 

A 

UNDER THE SIGNATURES OF 

SENEX, 

AND OF 

A FARMER, 

COMPREHENDING AN EXAMINATION 

OF THE 

CONDUCT OF OUR EXECUTIVE, 

TOWARDS 

FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, 

OUT OF WHICH THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS ARISEN, 

ORIGINALLt PUBLISHED IN THE NORTH AMERICAN. 



To whkt end should the conqueror spare us ? Our virtue and undaunt- 
ed spirit are crimes in his eyes, and will render us more obnoxious. 
Our remote situation, hitherto the retreat of freedom, and on that 
account the more suspected, will serve only to inflame the jeaJous/ 
of our enemies. — Tacitus. 



BALTIMORE: --^ 

PRINTED BY P. K, WAOHEB, CORNER OF GAY AND SECOND STREETS, 

1809. 



I 

Great public exi.s:encies, in free governments, 
have always called forth great virtue and talents. I'lius 
the passing occurrences of the day prove, that the lapse 
©f twenty-five years has not turned our nation aside 
from that salutary vigilance of their rulers and jealousy 
of their rights, without which our government could 
not have been established nor continued. 

Should we survive the fraud, prejudice and power, 
which have conspired for our ruin, we shall not owe 
it more to the timely illustrations of the sage, and the 
heroic devotion of the patriot, than to native good sense 
and unalterable attachment to liberty in the body of the 
people. We have here another proof, that the American 
nation is as conspicuous for its intelligence, as for its 
civil system, and its unalterable adherence to national 
freedom. The late attempts upon both, have electrified 
the whole country. The aged, the n tired, the timid^ 
the wavering, and the deluded, have all been brought 
into the ranks of that phalanx, which is determined to 
save the country. By such exertions, it must be saved ! 

Among the pens which have powerfully contributed 
to this conservatory alarm, is the able and ingenuous 
author of the subjoined letters. His fascinating candor 
and vigorous argument, have chased away the sophistry 
and premeditated delusions, with which the Hand of 
Power has covered its sinister purposes and our danger. 
These explanations of our public affairs, in a conjuncture 
which has involved the life and death of our enviable 
political constitution, will be long admired. The crisis 
which called them forth, is alone more interesting, than 
the dignity of the writer is venerable, and his capacity 
exalted. 



u^ 



SENEX. 



NO. L 

Although long ^ince withdrawn from those ac- 
tive political scenes, in which I once took an anxious 
part, I find it impossible to remain an uninterested, 
^'though I have been many years a silent spectator of 
passing events. The transactions of the day involve ob- 
jects too important to this western vvorid, too vitally 
essential to the independence of the United States, to 
leave it possible for any man, who justly appreciates 
that independence, to view them with unconcern. — 
However age may have slackened the course of that 
vital current, which once rushed impetuously through 
his veins, or retirement have enabled him to contem- 
plate without emotion, the low intrigues and vile strat- 
agems of party, the real patriot can never cease to feel 
for his country; nor can he see her hurried to the brink 
of that precipice, to dash over which is death, without 
raising his warning voice to announce her danger. 
That voice may be disregarded — he may anticipate the 
neglect it will experience — but he will do what he 
thinks his duty. 

Never, since the all-subduing legions of ancient Rome 
carried conquest and chains to the remotest regions of 
the earth, has human liberty been so nearly banished 
from the world, has national sovereignty been so nearly 
swallowed up, by one immense military despotism, as 
at the present moment. 

In less than ten years, more has been done than is now 
to be atchieveti.— Since her present emperor seized 

A 



i^ 



2 

the reins of the government in France, a much greater 
mili ciry force has been subjected to his power, than re- 
main, to be subdued. 

That Europe, if united and directed by one great 
mind, is able to give laws to the rest of the world has 
never been doubted. What is now wanted to complete 
that union ? ! hose vast powers, 'vvhich formerly check-; 
ed and balanced each other, exist no longer, or exist 
oniy to employ the remnant of their strength in execu- 
tii5g the mandates of their conqueror. i-.ven Russia 
obeys his a^ ill, and at the nod of Napoleon, weakly and 
wickedly directs her disgraced arms against her most 
faithful and most honoun;ble friend. A subnussive con- 
ti'.ent has received his yoke, and is ready to waste its 
treasures, aixl to pour out its blood in his service.* 

What arrests the application of this immense force to 
the residue of the world ? What secures a single spot 
of our earth from those chains, which are prepared for 
all, and which have been imposed on all, m hom the co- 
lossal power of France has been able to reach ? What 
prevents the perfect union of Europe, and the conse- 
quent subjugation of the rest of the globe ? 

No American is too ignorant to give the true answer 
to these questions — Destroy the preponderance of the 
British navy ; place the dominion of the sea in the hands 
of him who rules the land ; enable Bonaparte to waft 
his countless legions to whatever shores he may direct 
them, and the most uninformed of my fellow citizens, 
the most obsequious and inflituated advocate of that 
fatal system, which so steadily pursues this object, 



* The present manly exertions of Spain, so honourable to the 
people of that country, and so disgraceful to their rulers, will, I 
ftar,give no permanent check to the progress of French domina- 
tion. It is much to be apprehended, that this late assertion of 
rational independence, made by a gallant people, who had been 
betrayed by their government, will terminate in a bloody pros- 
cription, of which all that is noble and patriotic, will become the 
victims. Certainly, without the aid of England, not the mpst 
romantic chivalry could hope for success. 



ii>ust feel that the last barrier to the universal empire of 
one man, is removed. 

I do not think it necessary to prove this proposition. 
It is one of those self-evident truths, which, like an 
axiom in mathematics, carries conviction with it. No 
mind can resist its intrinsic demonstration. 

What then is the course which America ought to pur- 
sue ? What does her interest dictate ? What v ill rescue 
her liberty from impending danger ^ What will best se- 
cure her independence ? 

These are questions most deeply interesting to us 
all, and on which it Ipehoves us all niost seriously to 
reflect. 

To those who guide the councils of the nation, it 
belongs, to mark out the nation's course, and I shall 
noi presume to say, what that course ought to be. But 
this I will venture to affirm— the most deadly foe of 
American independence, the most malignant enemy 
of human liberty, can devise nothing so certainly fatal 
to that independence, nothmg so inevitably dt structive 
of that liberty, as impairing the maritime strength of 
Britain, and thus transftrring the dominion of the seas, 
from an island incapable of becoming a great military 
power, to a sovereign who already wields almost the 
wnole military force of the Kuropean continent. 

Why then should America throw her weight into the 
scale already so preponderant ? Why does she endea- 
vor to augment a power which already threatens to 
overwhelm the whole human race ? Why should she 
place additional means in the hands of the greatest sol- 
dier of the age, who is at the same time the most stern, 
systematic, cruel and unrelenting tyrant with whom an 
angry Heaven has ever scourged a sinning world ? 
Why should she endeavor to put beneath his feet the 
only obstacle to the full accomplishment of his ambi- 
tious schemes ? 

I know not why America should pursue these objects. 
That every motive which ought to influence human con- 
duct, should impel her in a contrary direction, and in- 
spire her with different wishes, appears to be so obvi* 
ous, that I reluctantly credit the clearest evidence which 
m continually flowing in upon me in support of the fact. 



Yet T am comp^eiled to credit it. I am compelled to 
believe, that those who now administer the government, 
either feel prejudices in flivour of France, and against 
England, which have determined them to put in hazard 
the independence of their country, by becoming the 
ally of the former in a war, undertaken and carried on 
for the extermination of the latter ; or they Relieve that 
England must sink, that the attempt to defend our in- 
dependence must then inevitably fail, and that it has 
become the part of wisdom to diminish the severity of 
slavery, by courting in time the favor of our master. 

If, in these opir<ions, my iellov/ citizens concur 
with their rulers, desperate indeed is their situation, 
and vain would be any attempt of mine, to arouse their 
nobler feelings. But I cannot yet believe, that the spi- 
rit of '76 is entirely extinguished. J cannot yet believe 
that America has wrested the right of self-government 
from a parent state, \yhose laws are the freest and 
mildest of Europe, from v.hom we derive the wisest 
and the soundest institutions, as well as the best guards 
of liberty, in order to surrender that inestimable privi- 
lege to an unfeeling military despot, in whose handg 
rewards, bribes, chains, confiscation and death, are in- 
struments, which, in the execution of his plans, he iis^s 
with absolute coid-l)looded indiifercnce. 

I shall, therefore, devote a few numbers to the pur- 
pose of inviting the attention of my countrymen, to 
some of the most conspicuous of those facts, which ap-;- 
pear to me to demonstrate the existence of that baneful 
system, which I have ascribed to those in power, 

SENEX. 



NO, IL 

T HAVE said, that those, who rule our councils, 
have been regularly and systematically urging the na- 
tiH'i into the arms of France, by plunging us into a war 
w th Brit in. The mode, by w hich alone this pernicious 
o jcct can be effected, is too apparent to be mistaken. 
I'he power of j^eace and war being essentially in the peo- 
ple, their minds must be prepared for war, before they 
can be engaged in one. It is not by openly avo^ving 
the design, that this can be accomplished The people 
of this country are disinclined to war, and an open di- 
rect avowal of a wish to involve them in one, might 
defeat its own purpose. It is by rousing the angry 
passions ; by exasperating those Iceen rescntntCMts, 
which have been excited against a foreign nation, that 
the x^mericans are to be prepared to wage war upon 
that nation. It is by exaggerating the injuries inflicted 
by Britain ; by concealing, softening, and even denying 
those heaped upon us by France ; by misrepresenting 
the conduct of those powers, and misstating their views, 
that America is to be induced to focilitate the imposi- 
tion of manacles on herself, by uniting with the latter 
to hasten the downfall of the former. 

Who has not perceived the too successful industry 
with which this baneful system has been pursued ? 

I will not invite my fellow citizens to look back to 
1793, and to follow the man on whom t.ie people have 
be stowed their confidence, from that period to the pre- 
sent. I will not invite them to recollect the ardent and 
persevering zeal, with which those men continued to 
defend the \ij;\\t of France to exercise, in this country, 
the choicest attributes of sovereignty ; nor will I call 
their attention to the malign antrage with which the 
best patriots of our country vrere pursued, for defend- 
ing that sovereignty. But it will be useful to advert 
to one fact, which appears to have escaped the public 
attention, and v/hich is of some importance in marking 
the temper of those who govern public opinion. It is 
this : In the measures adopted by the belligerent pow- 
ers, which are deemed irijurious to this country, France 
has generally taken ihe lead = I or the purpose of ex- 



asperation, the past ofiTences of Great Britain are fre- 
queiitiv rccapiiul.tcd. Among them i-, the order of the 
9th ofJimc, 1793. Neither the subsequent treaty, nor 
the ample compensation we have received for captures 
macle under thai order, can erase it fn^m our catalogue 
of injuries. Our resentments are still to be excited by 
it. Yet we are never told, that in the preceding month, 
a decree still less defensible in principle, stih more in- 
jurious to our rights, was made by the government of 
France. We are never told, that for the captures un- 
der this and other decrees of the same power, which 
sul^jected to confiscation every vessel sailing under the 
American flag, no compensation has ever been made. — 
Degrading to our government and to our nation, as 
have, and continue to be, the claims and practices of 
France, we are never reminded of this, or of any other 
fdct which mighi disclose to us our real situation, 
\yhilst every measure adopted by a nation struggling 
for her own liberty, m which ours is involved, is pre- 
sented to us in the most odious colours, and dilated 
upon with an assiduity v.hich never relaxes. 

i shLtll not rely on the conduct of those now in power, 
while they constituted an opposition, but shall pass to 
those transactions, ^hich manifest the temper with 
which tiiey have administered our national aflairs 

In the United States, as in all popular governments, 
public opinion is in a great measure regulated by the 
Press. It is, of consequence, the vehicle by which the 
government conveys to the people those sentiments 
which it w ishes to inculcate. In those presses, there- 
fore, ^vhich enjoy the sunshine of ministerial favor and 
patronage, which are professedly devoted to the sup- 
port of tlic administration, and to the furtheran&e of 
its designs, we may look with confidence for the cer- 
tain expression of the ministerial will. All have per- 
ceived with what unwearied diligence these presses 
have laboured to diffuse through the mass of the peo- 
ple, a most rancorou.s and envenomed hate of Lngland, 
while every fact, ^iiich might open their c}es to the 
real dangers to be a]:)prehended from France, has been 
carefully kept out of view. No man, who v/ill look 
into these papers, and they Have been read ^^•ith par- 



tiality by a ^reat majority of the community, can refuse 
his assent to the truth, that the ruling sentiment which 
pervades them is hostility to Knt'land, and a conse- 
quent accordance v.'irh the views of France. 1 will not 
cite paragraphs to illustrate the truth' of this assertion. 
I make it fearless of contradiction. ; he columns of 
the papers alluded to, are replete with evidences of the 
fact ; and those who are not satisfied of its verity, 
would require some proof auxiliary to his own splen- 
dour, that the sun shines at mid-day. No man can in- 
spect the Aurora, the National Intelligencer, the Enqui- 
rer, or any other paper enjoying the favour of admin- 
istration, without perceiving one unvarying effort to lead 
the American people into a war widi j'^ngLnd. 

1 do not mention this fact as one which has not been 
observed by others, for there are few who have not felt 
its influence, but for the purpose of requesting the at- 
tention of my fellow cidzens to its orighi and intended 
effect. 

Can it be believed, that papers which are deemed 
semi-ofiFicial, which are known to devote them.selves to 
the service of the adminis' ration, and to partake of its 
bounty, would contintuill} urge a system which that 
administration disapproved ? It cannof be believed. 
No man can hesitate to admit, that the press is a pow- 
erful engine, wielded by the governme .t skiltuiiy, and 
with immense efl:ect, for the promotion of its favourite 
object. 

If the means constantly employed have a certain and 
obvious tendency to produce a particular end, that end 
must be desired by tho^e v\ ho employ the means. — 
Who then can resist the conclusion, that a war with 
Britain is most anxiously desired by that administra- 
tion, under whose auspices the means calculated to 
produce it, are so unremitting]}- employed ? 

Let it not be said, that it is unjust to ascribe to the ad- 
ministration, opinions which may be propagated by the 
editors of news-papers, or that the fact is in itself too 
unimportant to form the b.isis of so serious a charge, as 
a desire to involve the nation in a war, which, without 
the interposition of Providence, mist terminate in the 
subjugation of this once free and happy country. The 



^'■^.T' 



iiiivour of p:overnment would be infalliljly withdrawti 
from papers, which obstinately persisted in opposing 
its views ; and no man is so ignorant o^" the influence of 
the press, as to deem it an unimportant instrument in 
efiecting great political objects. By no men in exist- 
ence, is its capacity more justly appreciated, than by 
lliose wh('m it has elevated to almost unlimited power, 
and who now use it as a mean to excite our hostility 
as:ainst Eni>:land. 

It is then a most serious and a most infallible proof of 
the- spirit by which the present administration is actu- 
ated. It is one wliich demands the solemn considera- 
tion ol the American people. 

SENEX, 



NO. Ill 

From the opinionb incessantly inculcated tliroiioii 
the prcbb, that powerful engine, by \\'hich governments 
operate most efficaciousiy on the minds ot the people, 
I have inferred the spirit of hostility to England and de- 
votion to France, by which our administration is actu- 
ated. I am now about to call the attention of my fellow 
citizens to another circumstance, which, to my mind, 
is not less conviiicing. 

In the United States there will ahvays be men who le- 
vote them.ielves to the president. 'J'hey utter opinions 
which they believe to be his, and maintain those pro- 
positions which they belit ve him to advocate. Of these 
some are known to be in his confidence, and to derive 
immediately from himself the ideas which they com- 
municate. From these intermediaries, others are con- 
tent to receive their instructions, and the ass ^^nni' nt 
of the parts they are respectively to perform. Throu,8:h 
this medium, not indeed so extensively as through the 
press, but to a very great extent, does an administra- 
tion also develope its designs. 

Beyond the range of my own observation I pretend 
not to speak ; but within that range, t can confidently 
aver, that among those devoted to the administration, I 
have scaixely heard an individual, who did not breathe 
the most envenomed hate to England They appear to 
think this sentiment the test of patriotism, and an unerr* 
ing proof of riierit. Their utmost influence is exerted 
to. render it the common sentiment of the nation. Many, 
in plain terms, speak of war as proper, and all use that 
language which leads to war. My fellow citizens will 
Jiidge from their own observati©n, whether this fact ex- 
ists in the same degree in other circles, as it does in 
that in which it has been my lot to move. I believe it 
does exist in the same, or at least in a very great de- 
gree. If in this I am correct, docs not the facl: conclu- 
sively demonstrate the temper of the administration ? 
Can it be believed, that those who almost idolize our 
executive, who applaud all his opinions, and all his 
measures, who dissent in nothing even from his capri- 
ces, who perceive in him only the purest virtue an^ tlio. 




10 

most sublime inlelligence, can all differ essentially from, 
him on a subject more interesting than any other to 
this country, his opinions on which have marked his 
whole political course ? 

Although I should not be pardoned the proKxity of 
an attempt to enumerate the various circumstances 
which support this allegation, I may be permitted to 
.refer, for its more particular illustration, to two papers 
which have been highly extolled by the friends of the 
administration, and which may be safely considered as 
detailing its sentiments. One is the letter of Mr. John. 
Q. Adams to a senator of Massachusetts — the other ia 
the letter oi Mr. Wilson C. Nicholas to his constitu* 
ents. 

To those who are not personally acquainted with 
these gentlemen, their political characters must be in 
some measure known. Mr. Adams, the son of the late 
president, is generally deemed a man of talents, and of 
extensive information. The foul injustice with which 
his honourable father has been pursued, even in his re- 
tirement, and the atrocious calumnies which have been 
heaped upon that venerable patriot, by those now in 
power, have not restrained this gentleman from ally- 
ing himself closely with them, nor hom supporting 
their political system, wdth a zeal, which not unfre- 
cjuently outstrips his judgment. Since his conversion, 
lie is understood to possess a considerable portion of 
executive confidence, and to be intrusted with at least 
a general knowledge of its views. Indeed, his talents 
entitle him to a respectable station in any party, and it 
is not to be presumed, that he would rush with so 
much impetuosity into any system, the object of which 
he did not comprehend. 

Mr. Nicholas is the neighbour of the president, and 
has been long known to be his intimate and confiden- 
tial friend. While in the senate of the United States, 
no man vras supposed to be more certainly in the secrets 
of the cabinet; and, in the house of representatives, the 
favour of the executive is not understood to hav^ de* 
scrtcd him. 

In the deliberate opinions of these gentlemen, given 
under their own signatures, and prepared for the peo- 



11 

pie of the United States, we may look for the senti- 
ments of that administration, to which the}^ are under- 
stood to be devoted, and to defend whose system their 
letters were wTitten. 

It is not my intention to analyze these letters, or to 
expose to my fellow citizens the falLicies they contain. 
They are in the possession of all who read, and 1 refer 
to them, for the sole purpose of marking the inveterate 
hate of England by which they ^\ ere dictated, the soli- 
citude which they manifest to hide from die public eye 
the aggressions of France, and the anxiety they disco- 
ver to apologize for those aggressions, which cannot be 
concealed. 

1 appeal to any American who reads those letters, 
for the truth of the declaration, when I say, that the 
man who derived his knowledge of facts from them 
alone, would believe that war with Great Britain iiad 
become necessary. He would believe that England 
was the natural and inveterate enemy of this country ; 
that the destruction of her maritime superiority, v, ould 
be the epoch from which might be dated the commer- 
cial liberty and prosperity of these United States ; that 
in the invasions made by the belligerents on our neu- 
tral rights, she had uniformly taken the lead ; and that 
even the Berlin and Milan decrees, even the seizure of 
our property, and the absolute controul which France 
claims to exercise over our government, if not render- 
ed entirely inoffensive, were greatly palliated by the 
superior atrocities of British insolence and injustice. 

These opinions lead directly to war. They could 
never be so strenuously inculcated, by men whose ac- 
tions usually accorded with their opinions, but for the 
purpose of leading the public mind to war. And on 
whom is this war to be made ? On the only people of 
Europe who possess a single remnant of liberty, and on 
the only nation of the world, which arrests the rapid 
progreis of Bonaparte to universal dominion. 

§ENMX, 



12 

NO. ir. 

^o openly and so uniformly have those who go- 
vern tiie United States, manifested their hate of Eni^:- 
land and their iove of France, so deeply is this senti- 
men' felt, and so boldly is it expressed, that in show- 
ing its existe ce, I am only ; roving what is piibiioly 
avowed. The passion is deemed meritorious, and v e 
man who would deny it to tlie administration, wou Id 
probably be pronounced a cahimnlator, from whose 
imputations it wonkl be rescued bv its friends. Yet I 
shall mention some other transactions, of a still more 
serious nature than tliose already stated, \\hich appear 
to origimte in, and seem designed to promote, that 
spirit of jTcjudice which leads to war. 

Tlie measure to which I shall first advert, is the act 
of congress commonly denominated the non -intercourse 
law. 

'iliis act is a direct attack upon the commerce and 
manufactures of Great Britain. It cuts off a very im- 
portant part ol her trade with this country, and prohi- 
b. s the importation from her dominions of a great num- 
ber of articles in Iiigh demand, the introduction of 
which, from her enemies, is allowed. 

It has been said, that this is a commercial regulation, 
and that we ha\-e a right, as an independent nation, to 
regulate our own commerce. 

I mean not to deny the right. Neither can it be de- 
nied, that we have a right to make war. I do not re- 
fer to this measure, as one in which the government 
has transcended its power, but as one in which it has 
exercised its acknowledged rights, in a manner ex- 
tremely hostile to one of the belligerents, and as favor- 
able to the views of the other. It is not to be doubted, 
that commercial regulations may be so framed pending 
a war, as to deprive the nation framing them, of its 
neutral character. A nation has certainly a right to 
refuse all communication with one neighbour, and to 
preserve a h'Qt trade with another ; but the exercise of 
this right, especial!} in the midst of a furious extermi- 
nating war, could scarcely fail to be deemed imact of 
liostilitv. 



13 

In explaining the principle of this measure, I shall 
not depart from that brevity which i have p. escribed 
for myself, further than is necessary to be intelligible. 

The states of Europe have concurred in the exclu* 
sion of all others from participating with the mother 
country in the trade of her colonies. This commer- 
cial monopoi}- has become a part of their law of nations. 
The carriage of colonial produce, like the coasting 
trade, is confined to the vessels of tie country. With- 
out examining the abstract justice of this rule, I con- 
tent myself with observing, that it is a ruie which h.is 
received the assent of the commercial world. 

During the last and the present war, England has 
acquired sueh a superiority at sea, as almost to banish 
the flag of her enemy from the ocean. On the advan- 
tage resulting from this circumstance, she f unds her 
principal hope of obtaining a secure peace ; and is, of 
course, peculiarly alive to any measure which may di- 
minish the effects of that advantage. 

Disabled by the pressure of a maritime war, from 
carrying on her accustomed commerce, France has re- 
laxed those restrictions, which, in common with the 
other nations of Europe, she had imposed on her colo- 
nial trade ; and has called in the aid of neutrals, to 
waft to the mother country that produce, which, in 
time of peace, had been carried exclusively in her own 
vessels. 

This state of things produced a contest between 
Great Britain and the neutral powers. The former 
contended, that in point of strict right, she might le • 
gitimatcly prevent the interference of neutrals, to di- 
minish the effect of her arms. The latter insisted on 
the right to carry on any commerce, not contraband, to 
which the government of the nation v.ith which it was 
carried oii, would admit them. Without receding 
from these opposite pretensions, the parties seemed, in 
practice, by a kind of tacit agreement, to meet on mid- 
dle ground. Great Britain permitted the circuitous 
and interrupted the direct trade between France and 
her colonies. 

For a time, landing the goods in the United States, 
and reshipping them, was considered in the British 



u 

courts of admiralty, asevidenceof the circuitous trade, 
but it was booii discovered or all^dgcd, that under this 
thin veil, a practice prevailed, which was, in effect, 
equivalent to the real direct carriage of colonial pro- 
duce to the mother country. The English govern- 
ment thereupon declared, that their tribunals should 
not be precluded, by this cover, from examining into 
the fact, and deciding according to the truth of the 
case. This declaration produced much discontent in 
the United States ; and at the commencement of the 
discussions to which it gave birth, between the two 
governments, the non-iniercourse law was passed, 
avowtdly as a measure of coercion. 

On the policy of this act I shall be silent. I mean 
©nly to remark on its hostile aspect towards Britain. 

The two nations differed on a principle on which 
each claimed to be in the right, and neither could 
justiliably impeach the sincerity of the other. Under 
such circumstances, it is usual to resort, in the first 
instance, to negotiation, and if it be found imprac- 
ticable to effect an amicable arrangement of the matter 
in controversy, then, and not till then, is it customary 
for the aggrieved nation to do justice to itself, and to 
adopt those measures of reprisal, which, in its own 
opinion, the exigency may require, A resort to co- 
ercion in the first instance, unless the offence had 
been so clear and so serious as not to admit of nego- 
tiation, or unless it be in the case of some conqueror, 
who, in the insolence of power, forgets right, was, 
I believe, without a precedent in the history of ci- 
vilized I'luropc. Nothing could be more indicative 
of an indisposition to be on friendly terms with the 
nation against whom the measure was directed. 

This hasty and violent step on the part of the United 
S'ates, was the more remarkable, as, in our inter- 
course with the enemies of Britain, we had not only 
forJDorne to do justice to ourselves, but had been 
signally moderate in oar conduct under injuries, 
which were unquestionable ia th^ir nature, and weigh- 
ty in their degree. 



IS 

This act was denied to be a measure of hostility^ 
In its character it is completel)^ so. W'hecher vrc 
consider its motive or its object, it is an act of repri- 
sals ; and if we reflect on its operatioi , on the nature 
of existing war, and on the views of the beiiiger nts 
at the time, it is not only an act of reprisals, ' but is 
of a nature peculiarly offensive. 

It is obviously the opinion of the enemies of Great 
Britain, that the resources which enable her to pro- 
secute that war, which she now wages for her exist- 
ence, are derived from her extensive commerce. As 
these resources are impaired, her means of defence 
are enfeebled, and the probability of her being able 
to preserve her own liberty, with the loss of which 
ours must perish, is proportionably diminisiied. — 
Acting upon this opinion, the t) rant of the continent, 
b}'^ a course of violence and oppression, to which 
man in no other period of his history, ever submitted, 
has endeavoured to annihilate their commerce. In 
those countries to which his power extends, he has 
carried this system into execution, with a rigour which 
has reduced millions to pqverty ; and where his 
power is not yet felt, his influence has been exerted 
to produce a co-operation in this favourite plan, the 
success of which is to confirm him master of the 
world. 

That the opinion entertained on this subject by the 
emperor of France, is also entertained by those who 
rule the United States, has been repeatedly and pub- 
licly avowed. It has been assigned as an inducement 
to the measures which have been adopted, and the 
authors of tliose measures have openly vaunted, that 
their system would soon bring Great Britain to their 
feet. 

This act of reprisal then, made, contrary to usage, 
while a doubtful claim was under discussion, is un-^ 
derstood by ourselves, and is understood by France,- 
to be a most vital blow, aimed at the maritime poMer 
of Great Britain. It is aimed at a time, when she 
is struggling against the greatest potentate in the 




16 

universe for her existence. It is calf^iila'^cd to dis- 
able ner iVoin pro^ecutiniJ^ a contest, on the event of 
"whicii depends ihe cjucsiion, whttiier liberty shall be 
an empty s iind, or a substantial Hood. 

The tendency of such a meiJiure, the hostile spirit 
in which it orig-iiuited, ana the inliuence under whiclx 
it \\as adopted, uill be perceived by all who reiiect 
©n public tranbactions, 

SLNEX. 



17 

KO. V. 

That spirit of enmity towards England, and of 
devotion to France, which has long animated the ru- 
lers of the United States, which they have success- 
fully laboured to transfuse into the bosoms of the peo- 
pxe, and by which the non- intercourse law was dic- 
tated, did not exhaust itself in that favourite measure. 
It continued to manifest itself in our councils, and its 
influence was consequently felt in the negociations be- 
tween the two countries. 

The personal attachment of our late minister at Lon- 
don to the president of the United States, is of public 
notoriety. It was formed in his youth, and is one of 
those principles which have steadily guided his politi- 
caJ course. It is not to be expected that he will dis- 
close his full knowledge on this delicate subject ; yet 
his communications evince his opinion, that, had a 
real spirit of conciliation existed on the part of our ad- 
ministration, an accommodation of all the differences 
between the two nations, might certainly have been 
accomplished, in a manner which ought to be perfectly 
satisfactory to the American government. Indeed, it 
is impossible to contemplate the real situation of Great 
Britain, without feeling the conviction, that to the 
United States, viewed as a friendly power, nothing 
Could be refused, which ought to be asked. As a 
friendly power, wc could not demand a surrender of 
those principles, on the preservation of which, her 
maritime ascendency, and consequently her existence, 
depend. Of this description are believed to be the 
right of search, and the right of impressment. The 
right of search at sea, is sanctioned by a long course 
of general usage, and the right to impress from mer- 
chantmen her own seamen, seduced from her service, 
is supported by arguments which have not yet been 
f efured. The abuse of this right is not defended, and 
ought to be guarded against ; but its use is of the first 
importance, unless its rehnquishment could be com- 
pensated by regulations, which on our part would be 

C 



la 

faithfully executed, whicli would secure the restora- 
tion of deserters, and prevent the employment of her 
seamen in our merchant service : the exercise of this 
right is essential to the manning of those fleets which 
protect Great Britain from a degree of oppression, 
which might almost efiace from our memor)- the cru- 
elties, the outrages, and the exactions, of which un- 
offendmg Portugal is the last wretched victim. We 
ought not to wish its relinquishment, unaccompanied 
by such arrangements ; nor ought we to expect, that 
a satisfactory adjustment of so delicate a subject can be 
made, without stipulations which shall secure the exe- 
cution of our part of the contract. 

Yet it is understood to be the silence observed upon 
these points, and the note of the British ministers rela- 
tive to the Berlin decree, which are the ostensible mo- 
tives for rejecting, without even consulting the senate, 
the treaty lately negotiated with Great Britain. 

The perseverance with which the administration 
continues to demand, as indispensable to any treaty, 
the formal surrender of rights essential to the safety of 
the British nation, is complete evidence of a determi. 
nation not to conclude a treaty with them, during the 
present war. This circumstance will make the deep- 
er impression, if it be recollected, that when the mis- 
sion of Mr. Jay wsls announced by that great man, who 
so well understood, and so uniformly pursued the true 
interests of his country, all negotiation with England 
was reprobated by the party which now governs the 
United States, as being justly offensive to France. 

Previous to the sig-nature of this treaty, the Berlin 
decree was received. It was made after the victory of 
Jena had fixed the iron yoke of France on Prussia and 
the German empire. Elated with this immense acces- 
sion of power, the exulting conqueror proclaimed the 
British dominions in a state of blockade, subjected to 
capture and condemnation all anicles of the growth or 
manufacture of those dominions, although they should 
be the property, and be in the possession of neutrals, 
and closed his own ports against every vessel which 
had visited those of England. 



19 

At his order, the vassal monarchs around him, 
adopted the same measure. A more flagrant viola- 
tion of his own solemn engagements, or a more in- 
sulting outrage on the established rights of neutrals, 
and on the acknowledged law of nations, is not to 
be conceived. It could only have proceeded from a 
man, who, feeling his own power, was not only totally 
regardless of neutrals, but was confident that they 
dared not assert their rights. It evinces his convic- 
tion, that the influence he possessed in their cabi- 
nets, was sufficient to restrain them from resenting an 
injury, for which no precedent can be found in the 
annals of modern Europe. 

The result has shown, that he was not mistaken.- — 
Awed into submission by the terror he inspired, 
neutrals have crouched beneath his uplifted arm, 
and have received, without a murmur, the lash of their 
master. 

The direct object of this atrocious usurpation, was 
Great Britain. Unable to subdue that last asylum of 
national independence and of human liberty, in Europe, 
while defended by her hitherto invincible fleets, he 
sought to unman them, by drying up the sources of 
her revenue. One of the most operative means of 
effecting this end, was the prevention of the use of 
her manufactures in foreign countries. The violence 
of the measure, the injury it inflicted on those v. honi 
he had no pretest for injuring, and no right to 
<:ontroul, when weighed against the gratification 
of a vindictive and unlimited ambition, was as dust 
in the balance. 

From the cabinet of London, the object of this ex- 
traordinary decree could not be concealed, nor could 
its consequences be disregarded by them. If permit- 
ted to go quietly into operation, it would necessarily 
transfer the \vhole commerce that was carried on in 
neutral bottoms, from her ports to those of her enemy. 
Let the voyage to the continent be safe, while that 
to the British dominions is full of hazard, and the 
inevitable result must be, either that this whole ti'ade 
w ill be diverted to the continent, or that the portion 
of it which still continues in its old channel, v»ill be 



so 

burthened with expcnces, which must render it scarcely 
worth pursuing. 

As this unjustifiable encroachment on the sovereign 
rights of neutrals, was at the same a palpable invasion 
of their independence, an essential injury to their 
prosperity, and a total derangement of individual 
industry, Britain might reasonably have indulged 
the hope, that those whose situations placed them 
beyond the immediate reach of the great enemy of 
the human race, would not tamely submit to so de- 
grading a measure. If disappointed in this hope, 
it was not to be expected, that in a struggle for ex- 
istence, she vv^ould unresistingly permit to her enemy 
this illegitimate employment of neutrals, as the effi- 
cacious, though negative instruments of war, against 
her. It v/as to be expected, that she would oppose this 
tyrannical system, by such a counter system as a sound 
and well considered policy might dictate. 

To those nations with whom Great Britain had 
existing treaties, it was her duty to announce this 
necessary determination ; and it would have been 
correct in them, candidly to avow the course they 
designed to pursue. With the United States, the 
articles of a treaty had just been agreed on, and 
ihc instrument was about to be signed. To affix 
to it the signature of the commissioners, without a 
notification of the influence, which this extravagant 
decree might have on the future conduct of Great 
Britain, would have been a concealment which might 
be understood to imply a waver of the right to adopt 
retaliating measures, and which might, on the adop- 
tion of those m.easures, subject her to the imputa- 
tion of insincerity and breach of faith. It was, 
therefore, the dictate lof candour and of honour, to 
make a frank dec.aration, previous to the completion 
of the national compact, then about to be laid before 
the two p^ovtrnments. 

As this declaration only expressed a confidence, that 
the Urn..; d States would pursue such a course as was 
re.'iuired by their own dignity ; and announced no more 
on .he part of Great Britain, than a determination ts 
Take thof g measures which the exigency and her own 



21 

safety might require, it could Tumish to a friendly and 
independent power no motive for rejecting the tre?: ; 
which it accompanied. 

If, as is generally believed, the treaty was rejected by 
the president on the grounds which have been staied^ 
it must be considered as strong, if not conclusive evi- 
dence, not only of those foreign prejudices, of which 
there are so many other proofs, but of a subserviency 
to France, for which it is difficult to assij^-n any ade- 
quate motive, compatible with the independence of the 
United States. 

How painful must be the feelings of a genuine Ame- 
rican,, who reflects that to extort from Britain the sur- 
render of rights essential to her existence, and conse- 
quently to our liberty, we have co-operated with the 
tyrant of the earth, in a system of hostility against her 
commerce ; while the most direct attacks on our un- 
questionable rights, and the most open invasions of 
our sovereignty, on the part of that tyrant, so far from 
exciting in our government an}' sennment of resist- 
ance, cannot even suspend its efforts to exasperate to 
a still higher pitch our resentments against a povver, 
which, by a gillant nation, at length roused by oppres- 
sion, has been emphatically and justly termed "the 
shield of oppressed humanity !" — With what indigna- 
ion must such a man fmd, in the editors of those 
presses which are the vehicles of executive will, not a 
mere insensibility to these wrongs^ but abject and 
servile apologists for them ? 



22 
NO. VL 

The Berlin decree, A\hicli interdicted the lep:iti- 
snate conuntrce of neutrals, \vith tlie dominions of 
Great iiritain, and also in articles produced or manu- 
factured in those dominions, does, in its terms, posi- 
iively comprehend the United S ates. If, in its ex- 
pression, instead of the general description which is 
used, there had been an enumeration of the nations to 
which it was to apply, and the United States had been 
inserred in that enumeration, it would not have been 
more explicit or intelligible. 

No power can safely affix to the language in which 
the decrees of a foreign sovereign are expressed, espe- 
cially if that sovereign be an ambitious conqueror, 
whose lust for dominion no acquisitions can satiate, a 
meaning in direct opposition to that which the words 
import, unless authorised to do so by the most unequi- 
vocal declarations. Indeed, even then, it would be 
more desirable that the exception should be made a 
public act. 1 he United States, therefore, could not 
be justified in supposing themselves exempt from the 
oy-eration of a decree, the words of which expressly 
in.( hided them, unless officially assured of such ex- 
emption. Until such assurance was given, prudence 
and duty required tliat our rulers should act with cau- 
tious circumspection, and on the principle that this 
decree would be construed according to its letter and 
its spirit. 

Such assurances were never obtained. - An indivi- 
dual officer of the French government, who professed 
himself to be uninformed on the subject, and who de- 
clared liiniself not to be the channel tlirough which 
communications of that description were to be made, 
conjectured that this regulation >vould not be applied 
to the Uniicd States ; and, on this vague conjecture, 
our rulers have conlideutly reposed. Not only have 
they omitted to take those measures of precaution, 
whicli tlie extremity of the outrage, and the imminence 
of the danger required, but the messap:cs of the su- 
preme exeGuti^ e to the grand council of the nation, and 
the debates in that covutcil, have given a publicity and 



23 

an official form to this blind and infatuated credulity, at 
which the cheek of every real American must i3urn 
with indignant shame. 

The justness of this censure is tacitly acknowledged, 
by the acquiescence of our rulers in the conduct of 
Bonaparte. No member of tLie administration, nor 
any one of its numerous chamDions, has ever once, in 
public conversation or in the papers, reproaclied his 
imperial majesty or the French government, with that 
duplicity or prevarication in this respect, with which 
he or they would be justly chargeable, had the exposi- 
tion, given in the first instance to the decree of Berlin, 
been of a character to entitle itself tOjOur confidence. 

This was the critical point of time, when a firm 
and upright administration, impartial between the bel- 
ligerent powers, and only anxious to preserve the ho- 
nour and the independence of the United States, would 
have adopted, and ought to have adopted, a system 
which would have rescued the nation from the disgrace 
and the calamities which have ensued, and from some 
of the dangers with which it is now threatened. 

No man is less disposed than myself, wantonly to 
provoke France — but no man is more perfectly con- 
vinced, that, with France especially, submission to in- 
jury invites additional injury. We must discredit all 
our own experience, as well as that of other nations, ii 
we doubt this truth. The government of the United 
States ought, on that occasion, to have assumed a firm 
and decided, as well as a moderate tone. Represen- 
tations of our friendly disposition towards trance, 
ought to have been accompanied with the most unequi" 
vocal declaration of an unalterable determination, not 
to submit to the outrageous violation of our acknow- 
ledged rights, which the execution of the Berlin de-^ 
eree would consummate. We ought to have required 
from authority an explicit assurance, that this decree 
w^as inapplicable to the vessels of the United States ; 
and, on the failure to obtain such assurance, we ought 
to have suffered our merchant vessels to arm in their 
own defence. 

This is not all. We ought to have stated to the bel- 
ligerent, whom this decree was intended to make us 



24 

the instruments of annoying", that the United States 
■\vould not submit to its operation, and shouid it be- 
come necessary, would take measures efFectuiuh to 
resist it. 

This is the course, which an impartial administra- 
tion, jciiious of the honour and independence ot tlie 
nation, would have pursued ; and this course would 
have liberate d our country from the most afBicting, 
perhaps from all, the distress that has been since ex. 
perienced. 

What could have substituted for this manlj system, 
the pusillaiiimous submissive line of conduct, that we 
have adopted towards France, and those irritating hos- 
tile measures touards Britain, which ha\e impelled the 
ration to tlie point of a war, with the only pow er in the 
universe which can shield any part of our globe from a 
despotism, the most ferocious under which oppressed 
humanity has ever groaned ? What but that temper 
"vviiich is ascribed to our administration ? 

Among' the various modes by v\'hich we have mani- 
fested our unfriendly disposition to England, few are 
calculated to affect her more sensibly, than the encou- 
ragement given to the desertion of her seamen. It 
was impossible net to contrast our constant refusal to 
grant any of those means, by which deserters from her 
ships of war might be recovered, with the facility 
which, under similar circumstances, was constantly 
experienced by the vessels of France. 

But whatever a: ology may be made for refusing our 
aid to a British officer, wishing to apprehend deserters, 
none can be given for enlisting those deserters into the 
American service. It was an open dq^arture from the 
praciice of nations, and a gross outrage on the received 
o.;inions of mankind. This inexcusable infraction of 
C;>mmon usage and of neutral duty, led to an aggres" 
«.'jn of so serious a nature, as to fill every Americaa 
bosom widi just indignation. 

'I'he American frigate the Chesapeake, having on 
board three or four British des'^ertcrs, was foUovv'ed out 
ofour v/atcrs byan English ship of war, who demand- 
ed the restoration of certain British seamen who had 
deserted from their service, v/erc alledged to have wi- 



25 

listed in oitrs, and to be on board the Chessprakc. On 
the refusal oi captain Barron to oomph.- \uth Jils cic- 
mand, his ship was attacked, and after bring- forced to 
strike her colours, the deserters found on board -were 
taken out of her. 

This outrage on a national ship, was universally and 
highly resented. With one voice, the people of Ame- 
rica exclaimed, that the wound inflicted on the honour 
of the United States, -must be healed, L^.nd the act 
be disavowed, or that the appeal must be snade to the 
last resort of nati(^^s. 

The cQurse of our administration on this cccasion, 
merits serious attention. 

A proclamation was issued, inhibiting the use oi 
our ports, not merely to the offending vessels or offi- 
cers, but to all ships of war belonging to the nation. 

Although this act of reprisals waa made at a time, 
when we were not informed that the British admiral 
acted under the orders of his government, and had no 
reason to believe that the right to search a national 
ship, under any pretext whatever, would be asserted, 
yet its apology will be found in the violence of the ag- 
gression, and in the extreme irritation of the moment. 
Its continuance, however, after the motives, which 
excused it in the first instance, were removed, stands 
on totally different ground. 

In commenting on the non-intercourse law, I have 
observed, and I beg leave to repeat the observation, 
that it is unusual among sovereigns, to take into their 
own hands, by an act of reprisals, the reparation for 
an injury sustained, until justice has been demanded 
from, and refused by the offending nation. This rule 
is particularly applicable to the cases, in which it is 
not certain that the offence is to be considered as a na- 
tional act. It deserves peculiar consideration too, 
when the reparation selected, is by a neutral against a 
belligerent power, and is of such a character, as essen- 
tially to injure the belligerent and serve his enemy in 
the war. It will be cause for still greater circumspec- 
tion, if the neutral had before been susv c<ed, not on 
light grounds, of favour to one of the contending par- 

D 



2G 

ties. If, in such a case, the neutral would avoid the 
inM^iutation of partiality for the kind of reparation he 
has cliosen to seize, he must entitle himself to exemp- 
tion from the churge, by discontinuing his reprisals as 
soon as there is a reasonable ground for the opinion, 
that the offence is not the act of the nation, and that 
reparation for the injury will be voluntarily accorded. 

A continuance of reprisals after such a state of things, 
affords too much ground for the suspicion, that the 
neutral has caught at the occasion to indulge partiali- 
ties incompatible with neutrality. ^ 

Let us inquire how these principles apply to the case 
under consideration — 

On the first notice of the aggression, the British 
minister officially declared to our reprcsentati\e in 
London, his regret at the event, and gave assurances 
that the act of the admiral was net authorized by his 
go^Trnment. The right "\\ hich had been asserted in 
committing this outrage, was explicitly disclaimed, 
and a readiness to make reparation for the injury was 
voluntarily avowed. All this preceded any communi- 
cation on the subject from the American government. 

Wlien that communication arrived, it appeared that 
our administration had placed an insuperable bar in 
the \vay of reparation, by refusing to receive it, unless 
accompanied with a surrender of those belligerent 
rights, of the abuse of which we had complained, and 
the use of which were deemed by England essential to 
her safety. 

Under these circumstances, a proclamation was issu-* 
ed b}' the British crown, forbidding a repetition of the 
outrage v hich had been committed, and pj*escribing 
for their ofiicers, in future similar situations, a line of 
conduct, which would be perfectly unexceptionable. 
Tn parliament, also, the act of admiral Berkley was dis- 
claimed ; and the administration fmdino* that our mi- 
ulster in London was not authorized to separate the 
affair of the Chesapeake, from the multiplied and com- 
plex subjects of discussion between the two countries, 
deputed an envoy extraordinary to the United States, 
for the ex precis and single purpose of compensating for 
this particular injury. 



27 

Never haS a proud and high-minded nation manifest- 
ed more solicicude to repair an involuntary wrong ; and 
never, under similar circumstances, has a reasonable 
reparation been refused by a nation, whose dispositions 
were favourable to conciliation. 

In the very threshold of the negociation, the British 
envoy encountered an obstacle, which arrested his fur- 
ther progress. To leave it possible for Great Britain, 
\i»ithout self-abasement, to make further compensation 
for the injury which had been sustained, he deemed it 
indispensably necessary, that the United States should 
forbear further to compensate themselves. For an un- 
authorised injury, a signal and unequivocal apology 
had already been made ; and he conceived that repara- 
tion, in addition to the apology, was, in its nature, the 
act of a friend, which, without degradation, could oriy 
be offered to a friend. The continuance of the punish- 
ment, which had been inflicted in the first moments of 
resentment, was thought totally incompatible ^vith this 
idea. Under these impressions, Mr. Rose required, 
as a preliminary to the compensation he Vv'as instructed 
to offer, the revocation of the proclamation, which 
refused the common rights of hospitality to the ships of 
his government. 

This preliminary was denied ; and on this punctilio 
was the negociation broken off. For an offence com- 
mitted on the high seas by a British admiral, which 
has been disavowed by his government, the repetition 
of which has been forbidden, to compensate for which, 
even after we had taken compensation into our own 
hands, a special envoy has been sent to our country, 
we still refuse to all the ships of war of the British na- 
tion an important privilege, which we grant to her ene- 
my, and which is never refused to a friendly power. 

I mean not to defend, on the part of Britain, the rup- 
ture of the negociation on this punctilio. The occa- 
sion was one on which, I conceive, the wise adminis- 
tration of a powerful empire might, without self-degra- 
dation, have receded somewhat further than is warrant- 
ed by rigid practice and principles. But I think it 
may be safely affirmed, that the conduct of the Ameri- 
can government is without a precedent, and cpuld only 



28 

have been exhibited by a nation, determined not lu 
adjust tlie difference to which the negociation related. 
No instance can be adduced in which, for an unautho- 
rized offence, a nation has undertaken to do itsch 
justice by making reprisals, and has, after the wish 
to repair the inju^-y was avowed, and a special en- 
voy, deputed for that purpose, was received, refused 
to suspend reprisals, in order to give time for ad- 
justing the degree of reparation which should be 
made. No instance of the kind will ever be fur- 
nished by a nation, not predetermined against an ac- 
commodation. Had this point been yielded by Eng- 
land, the negociation would ha\'e broken off on some 
other. 

In that able and eloquent defence of the course 
pursued by his government, which the secretary of 
state has made m his letter to Mr. Rose, he has 
cited three examples from British history, as being 
analofrous to this. It required not the penetration of 
Mr. Madison, to perceive the dissimilitude of those 
cases, from tluU to which they were applied. In 
them Great Britain did not pretend, by her own act, 
to punish the aggres.ion of which she complained. 
She demanded redress from the offending govern- 
ment, and received it. In this, we have ourselves 
puiiished the aggression ; after vhich, although it 
was not made under the authority of government, 
reparation is offered, provided we will discontinue 
the punishment mflicted by ourselves, and thus place 
ourselves, as nearly as is now in our po\\'er, in the 
situation in which Britain stood, \vhen she demand- 
ed and received reparation from Spain. This nc 
have refused to do. In no point docs a resemblance 
exist between the cases quoted, and that to which 
they are applied. 

It is not easy to avoid drawing the contrast, be- 
tween the conduct of our administration on this oc- 
casion, and on one of at least as serious a nature, 
where the aggression proceeded from a different 
qu.^rter. 

To the preservation of the American Union, no 
one ubj;:ct IS perhaps iiiorc esseniiai, than the ii'te 



59 

«avigaiion of the Mississippi, and the right of deposit 
at New-Orleans. This right, secured "by a solemn 
treaty, was violated without a plausible pretext to jus- 
tify the wrong-. The whole commerce of the west- 
ern states, down the only channel M'hich conducts it 
to the ocean, was arbitrarily arrested, not by a mi- 
litary officer alledging a sudden injury, which he 
misconceived himself authorised to redress, but by a 
solemn and deliberate act of the civil government. 
What, on that qccasion, was the conduct of our ru- 
lers ? Did they take into their own hands the pun- 
ishment of the aggression ? Did they refuse to re- 
ceive reparation for it until their other claims were 
conceded ? Did thty expect an envoy extraordina- 
ry to make this reparation ; and after the aggresjiion was 
disavowed, would they have refused, while adjusting the 
quantum of reparation, to discontinue the punishment 
they had infiicted ? No — this was not their con- 
duct. The aggression proceeded from Spain, then 
the humble vassal of France, and a very different 
course was pursued. Our rulers then declared, that 
reprisals generally led to war, and v/ere never made 
by a pacific nation, until justice had been demanded 
and refused. Instead of waiting for a special envoy 
from Madrid, they dispatched one to Paris ; and, in- 
stead of receiving an apology and reparation for the 
aggression, they bought off the injury by paying iif- 
tesn millions to Bonaparte, who then wanted money 
to prosecute the war, just commenced against Great 
Britain. By this contract, we arc promised, indeed, 
in addition to the island of New-Orleans, the value of 
which I acknowledge, but to the best use of which we 
were before entitled, an ideal country west of the 
Mississippi, the boundaries of vdiieh arc not ascci- 
tained, and our claim to which is a real misfortune. 

Who can refuse to mark the opposition in the 
conduct of the same men, in these two cases, or to 
ascribe that opposition to the strong prejudices 
X^'hich govern the United States. With what an- 
guish must the genuine American perceive, that 



50 

these prejudices entirely favour a military despqt, 
WHO is chasing human liberty from tiie iace of ilie 
earth; and oppose a nation, on whose ability to 
maintain her present arduous struggle, that best gift 
of Heaven depends for its existence ! 



31 
NO, VIL 

ON THE EMBARGO. 

1 WILL now solicit the attention of my fellow cit- 
izens to the embai"go. On the policy of di;s scit-d'^s- 
troying measure, on the mischief which it scatters 
through all classes of society, on the ruin it conveys to 
the inmost recesses pf our count>3^, it is not my pur- 
pose to remark. My observations will be confined lo 
the evidence it affords, of that subserviency to France, 
and hostility to England, which characterises the pre- 
sent administration. 

It is impossible to advert to this subject, without 
searching for the m(-tives in which the law originated. 
In pursuing this inquiry, those aids, which, calculating 
on the form of our government, we might reasonably 
expect to derive from official sources, are unattainable. 
A studied obscurity covers from our view the most es- 
sential information respecting it. 

As this subject was debated with closed doors, the 
public is not in possession of those arguments with 
which the bill was supported by its at vocates. The 
message of the president, and the documents transmit- 
ted with it, fumish the only motives which our rulers 
have avowed for this destructive measure* 

The message refers to the communications accom- 
panying it, as " showing the great and increasing dan- 
*' gers with which our vessels, our seamen, and mer- 
*' chandize, are threatened on the high se«s,^nd eise- 
** where, from the belligerent powers of Europe;" 
and concludes with recommending an embargo, and 
preparations for any event which might grow out of 
the crisis. 

The documents, so far as we are acquainted with 
them, show, that the decree made at Berlin, had always 
been understood and intended by the emperor of 
France, to be applicable to the United States, and that 
the British s-overnment had issued a proclamation re- 
quirmg then' seamen in foreign parts to return to th6 
service of their countrv. 



52 

It would seem then, that the only danger whicii 
these com mu 111 cations announced to our commerce, 
was found in tlie Berlin decree ; and the only increased 
dcinger, \\ hich threatened ouf seamen, was the procla- 
mation recalling British subjects to the protection of 
their native land. 

Let us examine these causes of alarm, and inquire 
what would probiibiy have been their influence on our 
administration, had there not been others, which, 
though unacknowledged, were more operative. 

Was the Berlin decree the real, efficient, moving 
cause of tlie embargo ? 

There is not, perhaps, a thinking individual in the 
United States, who would not answer this question m 
the negative. 

The president had acquiesced in that decree, with- 
out a serious and adequate remonstrance, too long to 
warrant a suspicion, that he contemplated resistance to 
it. When Spain, Avhose monarch was a known auto- 
maton, moving at the will of Bonaparte, adopted this 
mcasvire in terms, and applied it to the United States, 
it was scarcely possible to doubt the intentions of its 
mastor. Yet no resentments were manifested by our 
rulers, nor was any disposition shown to counteract 
this nefarious war on our unoffei ding commerce, though 
it might have been done, by means far less ruinous to 
ourselves, thaii those which \\ ere selected. 

If the system recommended by the executive, had 
really been directed against this decree, there could 
have been no conceivable motive, for not speaking to 
congress a plain and decided language, unless it was 
an unwillingness to prcchum to the legislature and 
j^eople of America, the grating truth, that the distress- 
they were about to experience, was to be ascribed ex- 
clusively to France. 

On tlic contrary, he would, in all probability, have 
stated the fact in explicit terms. It would have been 
his duty to have done so, that congress might have ex- 
ercised some judgment in determining, whether this 
arbitrary decree could h:ive been resisted more advan- 
tageously for the United States by an embargo, or by 
different means. 



3S 

Unfortunately, no American, who, has been withift 
the V. alls of the house of representatiAes, can ascribe 
to the majority of congress, a very high degree of dis- 
cernment ; but it is impossible to impute to them such 
excess of foliy, as to suppose they wouid have selected 
an unlimited embargo, as the besi means ot defending 
our commerce against this atrocious attack upon it. 
Of all that could be chosen, it is the most destructive 
to ourselves, and the least efficacious. A simple no- 
tification to our merchants, of the determination an- 
nounced by the French emperor, unaccompanied by 
any protecting measure whatever, would have been 
infinitely more eligible. Allowing to the cruisers of 
France the utmost success that our fears could antici- 
pate, and the injuries our merchants could have sus- 
tained from them. Would have borne no proportion to 
those inflicted by the embargo. If the fear of giving 
offence, restrained the president from recommending, 
and congress from adopting, that obvious and honour- 
able system of resistance, wliich proved successful in 
1798, yet the armed ships of France, which escape the 
active vigilance of the British cruizers, could not an- 
noy our neglected commerce to an extent, M'hich would 
bear any comparison with its present suffering, nof 
even to an extent which might not have been covered 
by insurance. 

But we deceive ourselves, if we believe, that the 
embargo, if really intended as a measure of resistance 
to the Berlin decree, would be less offensive to the 
haughty master of the European continent, than those 
which were taken in 1798. Oppo/ition to his will, in 
a greater or less degree, displayed in one mode or 
in another, is an unpardonable crime, for which pun- 
ishment inevitably follows, when the fit occasion for 
inflicting it shall arrive. \Ve ought to know him bet- 
ter, than to believe, that he will excuse an embargo, if 
intended to thwart his designs, sooner than more vi- 
gorous and more efficacious measures. 

But the most conclusive evidence on this subject, is 
afforded by the language and conduct of the adminis- 
tration, and of its confidential adherents. They saf 

E 



34 

that the Berlin decree Avas a dead letter, innocent in 
point of fact, though tremendous inform. It was a 
mere verbal injur}^ which might indeed insult our so* 
vereignty, but could not substantially impair our in- 
terests. 

1 ;.uman folly is not so extravagant, as to guard against 
«uch an atiack with such an armour. 

Complete refutation of the opinion here controverted, 
is also to be derived, from the direction which is given 
to the public sentiment. The people are exhorted to 
submit with patience to the cahmiities they feel, be- 
cause this self-annoying system must soon bring Bri- 
tain to our feet ; they are taught to believe, that its 
continuance or suspension, deper.ds on the course of 
the British cabinet ; and that, should A\e engage in a 
war, it is against Britain we are to wage it. In ma- 
king military appointments, every principle of propri- 
ety and decency is disregarded, in ordtr to l^estow 
commissions on. men, reconmiended only by their uni- 
fo^-m submission to t|^ w ill of France, and their uni- 
form exertions to am^ance the power of Bonaparte. 

These circumstances are incompatible with the idea, 
that it was against the Great Nation, this ruinous 
measure was intended to operate. 

It is not then in the Berlin decree, that we are to 
Find the motives for this fatal act. 

The British proclamation was a common and legiti- 
mate act of sovereignty, at which no nation has a right 
to be dissatisfied. The recall of their subjects to the 
defence of their country, affects not us, and can fur- 
nish no cause for any extraordinary measure on our 
pint. If it denotes a determination to impress their 
seamen found in our merchant vessels on the high seas, 
thcit is no more than the continuance of a practice, 
which has existed throughout the last and the present 
Avar, under which our commerce has flourished in an 
unexampled degree, and our prosperity has been car- 
ried "to a height, Avhich, until this fatal blow, given to 
it by ourselves, all other nations might view with 
envy. It could not, therefore, furnish a motive for 
annihilating that commerce, and destroying ihai pros- 
perity. 



35 

The Gom muni cations made with the message, then, 
do not furnish the real motives for the emb. rgo. It 
cannot be believed, that the American legislature iias 
passed an act, suspending indefinitely the whole foreign 
commerce, and nearly all the revenue of the Uniied 
States, paralising the v.hoie industry of the nation, 
reducing thousands to sudden beggary, and banishiDg 
a most useful class of men from their country, upon 
reasons so totally incapable of proving its necessiiy or 
utility, to the satisfaction of any reiiecting statebman. 

If we may credit communications made to the pub- 
lic, by members of congress, the total insuniciency of 
the reasons assigned in the message, to support the 
measure recommended, was so obvious, and v\ as urged 
with such force by its opponents, that its friends were 
compelled to take refuge under the confidence repos^ed 
in the president, and the certainty tha he would not 
have recommended the measure, had he not ^ osses^ed 
intelligence which proved its propriety. 

How must we be surprised, if in these times any 
thing could surprise us, to learn that a measure, so 
deeply interesting to every eiiizen, was passed by the 
legislature of the Union, because such was the will of 
the executive. It had been supposed, and the theory 
of our constitution, as well as the practice of former 
times, justified the supposition, that en an occa.ion 
which so vitally affected the whole community, the in- 
formation and reasons, wh^ch had satisfied the judg- 
ment of the president, would be truly conveyed to the 
legislature, that the judgment of that body might be 
satisfied also. But we are authorised to believe, that ■ 
the conclusive demonstration of the insufficiency of 
those reasons, had no tendency to arrest the pernicious 
Txieasure, which was recommended. It^vasthe will 
of the president, and he must have sufficient reasons to 
justify it, although he had not thought proper to trust 
them to the legislature. 

What, then, were these secret reasons, which were 
so powerful, ds to produce an unlimited emb.irgo ? 

Are they to be looked for in the orders of the British 
council ? 



36 

This also is impossible. At the passag:e of the act, 
those orders were unknown in America. That which 
is unknown, and that which does not exist, are equally 
incapable of constituting the real motives of human 
action. 

Those, who are desirous of justifying this ruinous 
measure, and of ascribing it to the conduct of Britain, 
have the boldness to say, that private intelligence was 
received in the United S ates, on which the president 
and congress acted. This private intelligence, is sta- 
ted to have been a letter, published in one of our pa- 
pers, informing a correspondent that some measure, 
retaliating on France the Berlin decree, was about to 
be adopted by Kngiand. But is any human •eing, en- 
do \^ed with ordinary perception, so credulous as to be^ 
lieve, that the government of the United States ^vouid 
adopt a measure, so destructive of the national interests, 
on the fa th of a letter written, they knew not by or to 
%vhom, inserted m a news-paper, without any veriiica- 
tion of its authenticity, and stating tliat some regula- 
tion, the v/riter knew not what, was about to be made 
by the Britib)h council ? Nations do not adopt a sys- 
tem so pernicious to themselves, on such vague and 
uncer ain data. 

Had the British orders of council furnished the in- 
ducement for the embargo, the presideiit would have 
transmi ted, with his recommendation of that measure, 
his reaso:^ for making it. No man can believe ihat 
orders, which, the instant they were known, were sei- 
zed widi avidity, and urged in defence of this measure, 
would not have been assigned at the time as its motive, 
had their existence then been known, and had those 
wh , S' nee their discovery, have so eagerly caught at 
thtm, then in reality acted on them. 

It is not then in the orders of council, that we are to 
find the motive for imposing upon ourselves this dis- 
tressing burden. 

If neither the communications referred to in the mes? 
sage, nortlie orders of council, produced the embargo, ' 
what, let me ask again, did produce it ? — This severe 
punisimient cannot have been inflicted on our devoted 
country, without a grave and serious motive, Wh^ 



was that motive ? This is an enquiry which every 
citizen of the United States ought to join mc in 
, making. 

Atier the victor)^ of Friedland, and the treaty of Til- 
sit had extended the influence of Bonaparte over the 
north of Kurope and of Asia, he seems to have 
thought it unnecessar}', logger to exhibit the slight- 
est semblance of respect for the sovereign rights of 
those nations, u^hich had been theretofore, in some 
small degree, permitted to enjoy independence. — 
He seems to have required, that all other states, 
relinquishing t:e right of self-government, should 
penorm the part he might assign them, in his fa- 
vourite svstem, of combining the whole world 
against England, and cornering her navy, by de- 
stroying her commerce. In execution of this scheme,, 
it is knov/n, that he had required Denmark and 
Portugal to depart from that half-neutrality, which 
one had purchased, and in Vvhich the other had been 
indulged : to force Sweden into the same coalition, 
the arms of Russia and of Denmark, had been turn- 
ed against that gallant nation. 

There is every reason to believe, that this com- 
prehensive plan embraced the United Steites, and 
that it was notified to our government, previous to 
the recommendation of the embargo. 

It is known, that the arrival of the Revenge, im- 
mediately preceded that measure ; and it is under- 
stood, that she brought from our ministers in Eng- 
land, only duplicates of dispatches, that had before 
reached the executive. From France, however, very 
important and interesting communications are un- 
derstood to have been received : We know with 
what earnestness, motions, requesting that these 
communications might be laid before congress, were 
repeatedly urged, and with what perseverance they 
were rejected. It is extremely difficult to account 
for this concealment, unless these communications 
contained the secret reasons of that embargo, whicli 
. was recommended immediately after their reception. 
We know that the private letters, received from 



38 

France by the same arri\Ml, concurred in the infor- 
muiioii, liiat bouaparic, whose voice is pate had 

poaiCively declared, there siiould be no neutrals. 

I lie i^uis .vionix'ur, of the 20th of October, the 
most othciui paper oi" the French government, which 
lusiiiuiiitb no po.Kicai idea not sanctioned by the 
eai^.cror, coniimi.ces a parat^-raph, which seems to 
aL:5i^naLc me coarse pre.-.crj|jed for us, with these 
sentences : — " On the 26i:h of October, the co'ig-ress 
*'oi the Unced Stales opens its sessions at Wash- 
*' ingcon. No person doubts, that the first opera- 
" tioii of this assembly, Vvaii be a formal declara- 
*' tion of war against England. The public mind 
*' is so vvLirmed on this subject, that any member 
" of congress, who should dare to vote for pacific 
*' measures, would run a great risk of being very 
*' roughly handled by the people." 

We know too, from oificial documents, that 
France has since manifested some resentment, at 
our not having actually declartd war; and that she 
has taken some measures to make us feel that re- 
seritmen. ; and by acting on our fears, to Ibrce us 
into the d ciaration. 

It is diiiicuit to compare these circumstances 
with each other, and with the total imj^ossibility, 
that the motives publicly assigned for passing the 
embargo, can really have produced that measure, 
without feeling a persuasion, that we have drawn 
tliis ruin on ourselves, in order to deprecate the 
v.rath of the tyrant of the world, by uniting with 
him, in his favourite plan, to destroy the commerce 
of that nation, which presents the only barrier op- 
posing that universal dominion, to which he as- 
|)i;es. 

Ihis is the "invisible hand," to which one of the 
most intelligent and independent members of the 
house of represen atives alluded ; and the consci- 
ousness that the allusion was just, accounts lor the 
vindictive rage v\hich it inspired. 

The apprehension, that even this measure may 
not he dec mcd sufficient by him, Avhose "in^visible 
hand" moves neariv all the cabinets of the civili" 



39 

zed world ; and tl>:»t nothlnp short of war will <«- 
tisl) liim, can uionc arrouni lor ilw ui.rriuillinj^ cx- 
crlioiis ol those uho rule lUc Unirtd Slaies, U» pro- 
pan he public mind lor ihai mil cunbunimatiou of 
naiionul dcyfadallon. 



4.(3 

NO, VIIL 

Had the motive, for imposing on this country a 
perpetuai embargo, really been the preservation ot our 
ships, our merchandize, and our seamen, all of which 
are in truth destroj^ed by it, this baneful measure would 
have been limited in its operation to those object^- — 
There could have been no inducement to render the 
evil more extensive, by unnecessarily adding to the 
oppression of the mass of the people. 

Had 11 been true, that the orders of council and the 
Berlin decree really produced this mischief-be aring act, 
the legislature would have been content with guarding 
against those orders and that decree. They would not 
■Wantonly have annihilated that great stimulus to indus- 
try , the market afforded by loreign countries for its 
produce. 

By applying the embargo to American vessels, and 
to cargoes belonging to American ciiizens, these ob- 
jects would be protected, so far as they are now pro- 
tected. Under the operation of such a law, as well as 
under the operation of the actual law, American exter- 
nal commerce, carried on in their own bottoms, wou.d 
have been cut up by the roots. American vessels 
would have exchanged the chance of being captured at 
sea, for the certainty of rotting in our own waters ; and 
American produce, either in the hands of the mer- 
chants or of the people, must have found its market at 
home. 'J he difference consists in this : The home 
market would be a better market — more buyers would 
appear in it. We should still supply the foreign de- 
mand. We should be driven into that policy, which 
our present rulers have always so much favoured — we 
should iitive been compelled to withdraw from the 
ocean, and to confine ourselves to ploughing the land. 
Yet the produce of our labour would have found its 
Way to foreign markets, in foreign bottoms ; and, al- 
though its price would have been diminished, it would 
not have sunk to its present distressing state of de- 
pression. 

I do not pretend to say, that the embargo, thus mo- 
dified, would be a proper measure, far irom it. In 



4i 

any form, unless as a mere temxporary expedient, to 
give time for reflection, and to impress on our mer- 
chants, the seriousness of the danger, I think it most 
ill-judged and most ruinous. But I think also, that 
thus modified, it would be less ili-judged, and less ru- 
inous, than in its present all-debolating form. Most 
seriously do I deprecate the idea of relying on foreign 
bottoms, for the transportation of our surplus produce ; 
but still more seriously do I deprecate the idea of cut- 
ting off its transportation entirely, and leaving it to 
perish on our hands, or to be sacrificed to those, who 
must be compensated by immense profits, for the risk 
attending an illicit trade. Deeply should I regret the 
ruin into which American ship-owners would be plun- 
ged by this regulation ; but it is no alleviation of that 
ruin, to find the great body of the American people 
participating in it. No wise statesman w ill ever re- 
commend a measure, which shall wound the interests 
of our merchants ; but if compelled to choose between 
a measure which is indeed injurious to the commercial 
interest, and one which is not only in a still higher de- 
gree injurious to that interest, but which involves the 
agriculturist also in the same ruin, he cannot hesitate 
to embrace the latter branch of the alternative. 

Whatever difficulties this alternative might present, 
to a man who cherished ancient opinions on the sub- 
ject, it could be expected to present none to those who 
avow the fantastic notions, which have long been fash" 
ionable with the ruling party. Men who think com- 
merce not a real good, but an evil, which the difficulty 
of breaking ancient habits and prejudices compels 
them to tolerate ; who think, that by the cultivation of 
the soil alone, unaided by navigation, the true inte- 
rests of the country would be best consulted, could 
not be expected to hesitate betw een a measure, taken 
in a form to prostrate both commerce and agriculture, 
and taken imder such a modification, as to preserve 
agriculture from the ruin, to which commerce is 
doomed. When wc find ourselves disappointed in 
this expectation, w^e look to some extrinsic cause, fiir 
the solution of the difficulty. 



42 

Two reasons are publicly assigned. The first is, 
that a total embargo will force the Ijellif^-erent pow -s 
to change the system they have adopted — the second, 
that an embi^rgo on American vessels alone, would 
have g-iven our whole commerce to England. 
Let these reasons Ix; examined. 

It has been already shown, that this measure could 
rsot have been taken with a view to force a repeal of the 
orders of council ; lor their existence was at the time 
^^lknown. It also deserves consideration, that these 
orders, not having been tiiken as a me.isure of coercion 
against neutrals, but as a belligerent retaliating mea- 
sure upon France, it is improbable, that their repeal 
can precede the repeal of that decree, on which they 
are professedly founded. This yielding on the part of 
Kngland would be an acknowledgment of her inabi- 
Hty to contend with France, in this species of warfare, 
and would leave the latter power at full liberty to exer- 
cise h'^r usurped controul over neutral commerce, in 
such manner, as might most sensibly wound Great 
Britain, unrestrained by the apprehension, that the 
isanie weapon might be turned against herself But 
ho"^vever this argument might be disregarded by our 
rulers, who, fi*om the year 1796, have been anxious to 
try their strength in commercial warfare with Eng- 
hn;', the first is conclusive on the point. The em- 
bargo could not have been extendf'd, to the total de- 
privation of all commerce, in order to obtain a repeal 
of orders, not known at the time to be in existence. 
It might be so extended, for the purpose of forcing a 
surrender of other principles, but not of this. 

Neither can its extension be ascribed to a hope, that 
it Vi'ould compel Bonaparte to rescind theBerlin decree. 
Our rulers will never attempt to act openly and directly 
on his fears. Such a system would contradict all their 
opinions respecting him. But if they had proposed so 
to act, the modification suggested would have been 
more operative, than the measure in its present form. 
He would have perceived in it the counteraction, in- 
stead of the support, of his favourite system of warfare 
on British commerccv 



40 



Discarding the first reason, then, as having been ob- 
viously inoperative, let us proceed to the second. It 
is, that congress was restrained from modifying the 
embargo, in such a manner as to eRect its avowed ob- 
ject, without ruining the cultivators of the soil, by the 
fear that such a modification, while it diminished the; 
pressure on ourselves, would also benefit England, 
and consequently be offensive to France. 

Ought our conduct to be so iniiuenced, by such a 
motive ? 

It will be readily conceded, that the modification 
|)roposed v/ould have the effect suggested, and th^ir a 
neutral nation, in the general, cannot safely frame such 
commercial regulations, as will benefit one of two bel- 
ligerents, and injure the other. If the regulation be 
made without a sufficient motive of its ow , and with 
a view to its effect on the belligerents, it becomes an 
obvious departure from neutrality, and a measure of 
hostility. But if the regulation is dictated by plain 
and important national interests ; if it is framed wish 
an obvious view to the state of the country, and affects 
belligerents incidentally and consequently, it ceases to 
be a departure from neutrality, and to furnish just 
^ause of offence. 

Of this latter description, would be the modification 
in question. If the injustice of belligerent powers, es- 
pecially of France, with whom the system originates, 
compels us to relinquish the transportation in our own 
bottoms, of the produce of our industry, we are oin-i- 
ously driven to the necessity of selling that produce to 
those who will come to our own rnarket to purchase it. 
That the home market is left open to every competitor, 
is a measure apparently dictated by our substantial in- 
terests. It is not adopted with a view to its effect upon 
belligerents, but to its eftect upon ourselves. If one 
belligerent is in a situation to come to that market, 
with more facility than the other, this casual advantage 
arises from causes not produced by us, and gives no 
right to the party, who finds himself unable to reach 
our market, to say, that it shall, on that account, be 
©losed against all the world. No nation has a rig4it to 
«ay, that because vshe cannot purchase from us. we 



V 4,4, 

shall sell to nobody ; or that to promote her compara- 
tive interests with a rival, she wishes to destroy, we 
must sacrifice our own. This is a demand which no 
nation ought to make, and to which no nation ought 
to submit. It involves the claim of sovereignty, on 
the part of the nation making the demand, and betrays 
the dependence of the nation submitting to it. 

This reason then, which is openly and publicly as- 
signed by the friends of the administration, f r that 
.augmentation of distress, which is produced by the 
extension of the embargo to foreign vessels, is the most 
conclusive evidence which can be presented to the 
mind, of our inveterate hate to England, and of our 
fatal submission to France. Rather than not indulge 
that hate, we inflict the most serious injuries on our- 
selves ; and rather than risk giving offence to France, 
by a measure not offensive in its nature, with which 
she has not a right to be offended, we submit to the 
most distressing privvitions, that rank hostility to our 
J)rosperity could have dictated. 

This pernicious extension too, furnishes additional 
proof, that the real motives of the embargo have not 
been publicly assigned. 



4S 
NO, IX. 

The British orders of council are not, in princi- 
ple, so destructive of our commerce as the Berlin de- 
cree. The latter, by declaring all the dominions of 
Great Britain in a state of blockade, subjects to seizure 
and condemnation, every vessel found trading with 
those dominions. It consequently prohibits our com- 
merce with the British West Indies, as well as with 
her territories in Europe. This is a circumstance of 
the more consequence, because the facilities for priva- 
teers, which were furnished by the islands then under 
the controul of France, enabled them to annoy, to a 
great extent, all vessels sailing in those seas. 

The former leaves unmolested the whole trade be- 
tween the colonies and the United Slates. This is a 
difference of immense consequence. It also exempts 
from the penalties of the blockade, which is extended 
to all the European dominions of France, and of her 
allies in the war, those neutral vessels which will touch 
at any port in England, and pay a small surn of money 
as the price of the exemption. 

This relaxation of the riger of the blockade, has giv- 
en great offence in rhe United States. The irritation 
it has excited, would certainly have been sufficiently 
provoked, had this univ^ersal blockade of the European 
dominions of the enemies of Great Britain, been decla- 
red by her before those enemies had placed her domi- 
nions in the same state. Had she commenced this 
system, we ought to have felt against her the same in- 
dignation, which the Berlin decree ought to have exci- 
ted against France ; aiid we ought to have resisted 
these orders with the same energy, that ought to have 
been exerted in resisting the Bei-lin decree. But she 
did not commence it. And if the blockade can be 
justified, as a measure of retaliation, no relaxation oiF 
that blockade can add to its offensiveness. 

England then has, in leaving open our trade to the 
colonies of her enemy, stopped far short of France in 
the hostile career into which both have entered. 

There is a material difference between the extent of 
fh^s mc^iU'Cb; Ui HnotiKr respect. The Berlin de- 



46 

erce not only cuts off all intercourse betweei'i the UiiU 
ted Suites and the dominions oi" Great Brit.. in, but ibr- 
bids all traffic in articles of the growth or manufacture 
of ihose domiaivms. 

T'nis extravagant prohibition is not retaliated. 

It is then apparent, that the orders of council are, m 
their letter and spirit, much less comprehensive timn 
the decree, to retaliate which those orders were made. 

A general blockade, proclaimed by either of those 
powers, suggests one observation, which can escape 
no person. That a belligerent has a right ta blockade 
3i"'y port of his enemy, is admitted. It is onh^ requir- 
ed, that he should, in flict, invest that port, so as to 
make the attempt to enter it dangerous. So immense 
is the naval power of Kngly.nd, that she can, in point 
of fact, invest at the same time a very great number of 
the ports of her enemy, while France is absolutely un- 
able to station a blockading force at any port in the 
world. She dares not openly trust a fleet mto any sea ; 
^nd if lier ships casually steal into the ocean, their 
saiety depends on returning undiscovered. A block* 
adi?ig decree, therefore, by France, is an outrage upon 
neutrals, for which no semblance of apology can be 
framed. It is an undisguised and shameless licence to 
her privateers and cruisers, to commit piracy on all 
neutral vessels. 

Althoug;h hi , imperial majesty commenced this de* 
predating system, besought not to restrain his rage, at 
finding that his enemy followed his example, even at a 
distance. Although that enemy remained flir behind 
him, he could not tolerate the attempt to retaliate on 
himseli'any portion of his own injustice. His resent- 
ments I)rokt out in the Milan and Bayonne decrees, by 
which his outrages on the United States have been car- 
ried to extremities, which amount in fact to war. He 
subjects to capture and condemnation e^■ery American 
vessel which has ever been visited by an English ship ; 
he seizes all American vessels in his ports, or which 
his corsairs can bring in ; and he sequesters all Ameri- 
can pn^perty Ibund on the water or on land, with the 
avowed pur}:jose of confiscating it, if the United States 
do not decliu'e war against ii-^ii^land. 



47 

r-an^iap;e eaiinot licigliten thesfc rn6rmitles. The' 
simj^le narrative can receive no increased colou: ir,g 
from those epitht tb, which indignalicn woiiid nit* r- 
weaA^e with it. He must be dead to evC'V /American 
sentiment, who does not feci for his insihted and dis- 
graced country. If, uiider those '.hreats, the United 
States go to war \\ ith England, our independence is 
ah'eady but an empty name, and not even tliat will be 
long retained. 

It has been shown, not only that France commenced 
this system of warfare on neutral rigiits, but that she 
has greatly outstripped her enemy in the fiacitious 
course. The time will not be entirely mis\]^plied, 
which is devoted to a comparison of the ten.per to- 
wards the United States, w hich these two nations have 
displayed, in this contest of violence. 

Although the Berlin decree was an open and flagrant 
violation of the rights which were guaranteed to this 
country by a solemn treaty, as 'ueli as by the law of 
nations, yet no previous notification t\ as given to the 
United States of the intended infraction of those rights ; 
nor has any subsequent apology, so far as is publicly 
known, been made. Not only has tlie emperor of 
France treated us with this insulting neglect, but in the 
style of a haughty master, ofi'ended that his mandates 
are not executed the instant they are issued, he adds to 
the chastisement by fresh injuries, and punishes our 
disobedience in delaying a declaration of war against 
Great Britain, by seizing all our property within his 
grasp ; the confiscation o^ which, he plainly tells us, 
depends on our entering into the war he dictates. 

What has been the stjie in \\ Inch this contest has 
been conducted by h ngiand ? 

When the Berlin decree was issued, she expressed, 
ill decent terms, her confid-nce that the United States 
Would not submit to this gross infraction of their rights ; 
and at the same time, g^\VG the notice which the occa- 
sion required-— that, as Britain was affected essentially 
by this violence practised on neutral commerce, she 
Would be com.pelled, in her own defence, to adopt 
Ttieasures of retaliation against her enemy, "with res- 
pect to those nations who siwuid unresi^LUigly permit. 



48 

this decree to s;o into operation. When afterwards-^ 
those measures were adopted, they were communicated 
to the United States in terms of expressive regret, for 
the necc bsity which caused them, and of the readiness 
\A ith \vhich they would be discontinued, when that ne- 
cessity should cease. 

Biitain then, would not have applied her orders to the 
United Stares, had they taken measures to prevent 
her enemy from the unlawful use of their commerce, as 
an instrument of war against her. She would not now 
so apply them, if they would take such measures. — • 
And she will revoke them, the instant France shall dis- 
co'itinue the system commenced by that power. 

But ^\'ill France recall the Berlin decree, should Bri- 
tain annul the orders of council ? She has never said 
so — and we knov\^ she will not. The Berlin decree ha- 
ving preceded the orders of council, was not produced 
by them, and does not depend on them — Britam then 
wishes, hut France refuses, to discontinue this system 
of afjpjesiion. 

Afierthls brief and hasty sketch of the conduct of the 
two bel'jr-erfnt pc;wers towards the United States, let 
us for a moment turn our eyes on ourselves, and exa- 
rninethe impression they have respectively made on us- 

Towards Britain a high degree of resentment has 
been manifested ; a determination to resist her en- 
croachments has been avowed ; and war, should she 
persist in her course, is the language of all the ministe- 
rial circles. 

Do we exhiliit towards France a similar temper ? — 
Has the usurpation of Bonaparte of sovereign power 
over tb.e United States, in directing the course of our 
whole external commerce, in deciding for us the alU 
important question of peace and war, in seizing all our 
property within his grasp, and declaring that its con- 
fiscation depends on our entering into the war he orders, 
produced one indignant, one manly sentiment in th& 
bosoms of our rulers .'' 

Widi inexpressible mortification, must every genu* 
ine American answer — none. Instead of those feelings, 
and that energetic system, which the occasion so loud- 
ly demands, which a really independent nation could 



49* 

hot fail to exhibit, we are endeavouring to turn aside 
the wrath of the conqueror by obedience — We are en*' 
deavouriiig to prepare the public mind for the War lie 
directs. , 

. 'J'he genius of America seems to turn pale, and 
humble itself before that of France. We receive, with 
humility, and without a murmur, the stripes which 
his imperial majesty pleases to inflict. We dare not 
even writhe under the lash. With smiles we kiss the 
hand that scourges us, and lick the loot that treads 
upon us. 

At length, in an important part of the Union, the 
spirit of indepeiidence seems to revive. A light dawns 
in ;:he East, and gladdens the American bosom with 
the hope, that the inestimable rights of self-government 
will not be surrendered without a struggle. The peo- 
ple of New- ngland are awake—and have in some 
siigiit degree, shewn at their elections a disposition,- 
like the pe<'pie of Sjmin, to assert rights, which their 
gov ernment seems uhwiUing to maintain. 

Should this spirit extend itself, it may avert the dan- 
gers which threaten us. — France has a minister at 
Washington, and this portentous change may be com- 
municated to his imperial majesty, who will be careful, 
while Britain maintains her ascendancy on the oceaUj 
not to drive the United States to desperation. 

SMNMX. 



50 

NO. X. 

WiT^ a faithful pencil, guided by the hand of 
truth, I have endeavoured, in the preceding numbers, 
to sketch, in miniature, the most prominent features 
which designate the conduct of the American gov- 
ennnent towards foreign nivcions — A full life portrait 
has not been attempied. it v.ould require too much 
canvass, and be a work of too much labour. My 
object is to induce reflection ; for to mc it seems 
impossible to rsfiect, without perceiving the dange- 
rous piecij^ice tovvards which w^e are impelled. — • 
The partiality which has been displayed ; the efforts 
wiiich arc incessantly made to keep up the resent- 
ment of the nation against Kngland ; the extreme 
solicitude uiiirh has been manifested to conceal the 
outrages of France ; and the anxiety, \^'ith which 
apologies have been made for those '.^hich force ' 
themselves upon our view ; demonstrate but too 
clearly, .that, if the temper of the people will bear \i 
it, and France continues to insist on it, the resolution 
is taken to declare war against Great Britain. 

Strong as are our partialities for France, deep- 
rooted as is that hate of England, which has long 
rankled in the bosoms of our rulers, I do not as- 
cribe to those passions so much influence, as to be- 
lieve that they could, unaided by other causes, in- 
duce our administrition to incur the hazards of 
open war, and risk their popularity by declaring it. 
They would content themselves with increasing the 
prejudices, and fomenting the resentments of the 
people, so as to preserve, in their highest exaspera- 
tion, the ill dispositions they at present feel towards 
England, and incline them to carry, still further, that \ 
system of "war in disguise," into which we have J 
with so much alacrity, already engaged. If mc are 
dri\ en beyond this point, it is, I believe by external 
influence. 

The opinion, that Britain must fall, and that 
it would be madness in us to draw upon oursehcs 
tht vengeance of the conqueror, by any opposition to 
his will, is but ill concealed. A Uttle more of the 



51 

curtain is daily raised, and that secret, which was in- 
deed too thinly veiled to be hidden from us, had we 
not closed our eyes to the light we possessed, is 
more exposed to our view. I'he ministerial papers 
begin to speak still more plainly, and v^ e hear without 
much surprise, that Bonaparte is the minister of Hea- 
ven, sent to execute a great work ; sent to fulfil the 
prophecies, and establish the millenium. Resistance 
would of course be impious. 

I shall conclude these essays, with a temperate ap- 
peal, on this subject, to ir.Q reason of my fellow citi- 
zens. I ask them to examine ail the testimony the}* 
possess, to consult experience, to think with that se- 
rious intentness which the crisis so eminently deniartds, 
and, amidst real diiiiculiics, to decide ibr-themseh es 
what line of conduct affo.> ds the fairest and most ration- 
al hope for safety. 

That the independence of the United States cannot, 
without the interposition of a miracle, survive the fall 
of the British empire, is, 1 bcLeve, the opinion of eve- 
ry reflecting man, OF consequence, America can have 
no motive for endeavouring to precipitate that fall, un- 
less it be the hope, that her prompt and seemingly 
chearful obedience may lighten her chains, perhaps 
may save that poor remnant of self-government, which 
consists in receiving the orders of the conqueror through 
a fellow citizen, instead of a Frenchman. — -Bonaparte 
may give us a Schimmelpenninck, instead of a Louis. 

Let us enquire, whether there is any reasonable 
foundatio \ for this degrading hope. 

I will nut go through the long list of nations, that 
hav^e been oulDJugated by France. I will not attempt 
to shew the fate of those who have resisted, nor to 
contrast it with what has befallen those, who, endea- 
vouring to mitigate a fall they thought inevitable, have 
been swallowed in this all-devouring vortex, without a 
struggle for their preservation. 1 will select Portugal 
jnd Spain, the two last cases that have occurred, and 
isk that they may be considered. 

Portugal is the ancient ally of England. Her situ- 
ation created a natural connection with that power, on 
ivhich she neccs$a,rily relied for pvot^ection from Spj^ij^, 



52 

B'T*" she is not ?^enerally engaged in the quarrels of the 
coiitinent ; and, from the commencement of the pre- 
sent war, she has sought to preserve her neutrality. It 
js understood, that she had paid France high premiums 
for being permitted to remain in peace. 

Her complaisance, however, did not avail her. Af- 
ter the treaty of Tilsit, she was ordered to enter into 
the continental confederacy ; and, without knowing 
that these orders would be disobeyed, hrench troops: 
were marched towards that country, in order to occupy 
it. Under the pretext of defending them from Kngr 
land, their government was subverted, and their prince 
only saved himself by flying to the Brazils. 

A French general took possession of Portugal, pro- 
claimed tlie friendly views with which he came, dis- 
armed the people, dried up the sources of their wealth 
by destroying their commerce, and required from 
them an enormous sum of money ; not much less in 
proportion to their population and riches, than one^ 
hundred millions would be from tlie people of the 
United States. 

Portugal had giyen no ollence. Her conduct was 
such, as even to warrant the opinion, that she would; 
eiiterj though certainly Vvith repugnance, into the views 
of France. 

But Portugal, it may be said, was, in secret, friend-^ 
Ky to England. — Let us then turn our eyes to Spain. - 

From a period long anterior to the elevation of Bo-s 
naparte to the supreme power, Spain has been the obe- 
dient, the obsequious vassal of France. Without pre- 
tending to a Vv'ill of her own, she has made peace, and 
she has made war, as France has directed. She has 
submitted to the most serious privations, and has pro- 
fusely lavished her treasure and her blood, not for; 
Suciiiish, but for French purposes. No partiality for 
England was imputed to her, nor did the suspicion 
exist, that she was about to make a single eSbrt to, 
throw oft'thc galling yoke she had so long v.-orn. ; 

What has S[^ain obtained by all this submission ?j 
Is her condition better, or h her prospect less gloorny 
than thttt of other nution.s ? - 



Far from it Her armies have marched to the ex- 
treme points of the continent, under the banners of 
France ; there they are subdivided into detachments, 
ivhich render all exertion to return to the defence of 
their native land impotent ; the passes into their coun- 
try are occupied by the French, as their friends ; French 
troops are introduced as friends into their fortified 
touns ; an immense army takes possession of their ca- 
pit:'l ; its general is invested, by the vassal monarch, 
^vith supreme authority, and thus the whole power of 
civil g-overnmcnt is, in fact, transferred to him ; the 
king of Spain is then decoyed into France, and there 
compelled to abdicate his crown, and transfer his 
kingdom totlie subtle tyrant, to who!-,e seductive wiles 
he had f .lien a victim. 

Goaded into fury by this tissue of treachery and of 
tyranny, by which an ancient and gallant people saw 
their nation annihilated, and themselves transferred 
like cattle, to a foreign master, the Spaniards flew to 
arms. But the time to defend their liberties, to pre- 
serve their national existence, it is greatly to be ap- 
prehended, has been permitted to pass away for ever. 
Torrents of their richest blood, it is feared, will be 
shed in vain. I 'he pusillanim/ity of the government 
has betrayed the people, and they awake to a sense of 
their danger only, when to escape that danger is no 
longer possible. 

Yet the struggle is glorious. It elevates Spain to 
the highest point of grandeur, and gives a new lusire 
to the character of the nation. Every bosom, in w4iich 
the flame of liberty is not absolutely extinguished, must 
take a deep interest in her fate. Every generous feel- 
ing of the human soul must arm in her favour. 

Spain is a beacon, which ought to warn the United 
States of their danger. If submission could save even 
nominal self-government from the insatiate ambition of 
Bonaparte, that poor vestige of former greatness would 
huve been saved to Spain. If it could preserve to any 
nation the wretclied consolation of being governed, 
according to his will, under their ancient forms, S^»ain 
tvouid have been that nation. 



54 

On what foundation then rests the hope of the United 
States, that t>ubniii>bion can save us ? Is '.■ our dis- 
tance from France ? We are not nuich further than 
Si Domingo ; and what is distance to the lord of Eu- 
rope, and the master of the ocean ? 

Is it, as some infatuated men have said, that we of- 
fer him no inducenent to enslave us ? Vdin and futile 
illusion ! Since when has a weak, a rich and a popu- 
lous country, posse^sii)g the finest rivers in the world, 
aboundin-.r with ail materials for ship buildini^, capable 
of \ ieldins^an immense revepue, and of raising consi- 
dei-abJe armies, ceased lo tempt ambition, or to fur- 
nish motives to the concjueror ? This rich, and once 
h.ipp\ country, will afford to the emperor a vast ex- 
tension of his own power, and an increase of means to 
gratify his numerous favourites. 

We cannot then indulge the hope, that our insigni- 
ficance, any more than our submission, will save us. 

By submission^ we, in fact, add to our danger. — 
Let us only be true to ourselves, and, so long as the 
maiitime superiority of Britain remains, we are safe. 
But let us be unfaithful to ourselves, and, yielding to 
the inflluence of our fears, engage in the wars of Bona- 
par:e, and we become slaves, though Britain should 
remain fiec. 

I ask, what ally of France has not l">een compelled to 
enter into all her views ? Even Rviss'a, who can bring 
into the field near half a million of excellent troops, has 
entitled herself to the reproach of posterity, by turning 
her arms, at the direciion of Bonaparte, against a 
neighbour and a faithful friend, saved by the Balic 
from his grasp. Russia, powerful as she still is, gives 
up her own system, and becomes subservient to his 
o')jects. But what ally of France, who ceased to be 
formidable in a military point of view, has not, in form 
as well as fact, become her slave ? What hope, then, 
can we entertain of being more fortunate .'' 

If we declare war against England, we must carry it 
on as our master, under the name of our ally, shall di- 
rect ; we must receive into our country such auxili- 
aries as he shall offer ; we must pay, as our just por- 
tion of the burdens of the war, such sums as he shall 



55 

|5rescril)e. And being once in his embrace, when and 
how shall we escape it ? 

In submission, then, we meet a ruin, alike certain 
and disgraceful. We have no i^o{K , but in a maniy 
assertion of our rights, and an unyielding adherence to 
self-government. 

If, as is most obvious, the independence of the Uni- 
ted States, in the present condition of the world, rests 
on the maritime ascendancy of iLngland ; if our dangers 
are, in every point of view, increased by impairing that 
ascendancy ; if, by going to war with that power, we 
incur the double hazard of losing our independence 
from her destruction, and from the foot hold France 
will obtain in our coui iry ; ii our rulers openly mani- 
fested prejudices, and take measures, ^\hich lead to 
such a war — where shall we look for safety ? 

The/inswer is obvious. We m?ist. look for it to our- 
selves ; and we must look for it in a charsge of mea- 
sures, which can oniy be effected by a change of men. 
If we would not continue, as an instrument of hostility 
against 'he commerce of i\ngland, an embargo, which 
is ruinous to ourselves^ until we raise it by an actuai 
declaration of war, we must confide the c.cvernment of 
our country to men, who are not devoted to the mise- 
rable system, under wtiich we now suffer. 

The present is to the United States, a most interest- 
ing crisis. On the elections about to be made, every 
thing depends. It is scarcely less essen.:ial to attend to 
the state legislatures, than to that of the continent. Al- 
though the per?;ons we are about to choose, will not 
come immediarely into power, the elections will be a 
sure test of public sentiment, and \\ill greatly influence 
the conduct of those, who must rule us yet a short time 
longer. Every genuine American ought to recollect, 
that these elections possibly decide the liberty and the 
independence of his country. 

SENEX. 






NO. I 

Th e spectacle, now exhibited by the United States^ 
lias undoubted claims to a very distinguished place 
among those wonderful events, which are crouded into 
the early part of the present century. Bonaparte is 
not the first conqueror, to whom a servile world has 
bowed its neck : but a civilized and intelligent people, 
active, industrious, agricultural, and commercial, 
possessing all the means by which those qualities might 
be advantageously employed, suddenly withdrawing 
themselves from the ocean, and cutting off their inter- 
course with the world, presents a phenomenon in po- 
litical economy, of which the history of the human 
race furnishes only this solitary example. 

Planted by kind Providence in a bountiful soil, from, 
which our labour extracts an immense surplus pro- 
duce, we are commanded by our government to see 
that surplus perish on our hands ! Having acquired, 
from a judicious use of the advantages of our situation^ 
the second commercisil marine in the world ; a marine, 
which, after the transportation of our own commodi- 
ties, carries extensively for others, we decree, that our 
ships shall rot in our harbours ! Possessing a numc 
tous and skilful body of seamen, we present to thenj 

H 



58 

the gloomy alternative of starving at home, or seeking 
'emj)loymtnt abroad ! While wafted on a full tide of 
unexampled prosperity, we have oiirselve* turned out 
of the stream, have locked up our ports, and have de- 
clared, that the United States shall no longer appear m 
the society of nations ! We have imposed on our- 
selves a perpetual embargo, which, pressing like an 
incubus^ on the bosom of the nation, arrests the course 
of that vital current, whose healthful motion gave ac- 
tivity and energy to the whole political body ! ! ! 

Such is the disastrous situation to which we are re- 
duced, by an administration, to whose misrule this 
devoted country has, for eight years, been subjected ; 
by an admin. istration composed of men who, by decep- 
tive promises of imaginary good, had disgusted us 
with real happiness, and seduced us from the councils 
of true wisdom, to confide our destinies to them. 

It would be some alleviation, were this dark pros- 
pect brightened by the hope df better cimes. Un- 
fortunately, it is not. The calamities of the moment 
Ijelong not to the moment only. The burden is not 
lightened, by the expectation that we may soon be re- 
lieved from it. We have the melancholy certainty of 
bearing it until v/e place power in other hands. Those 
who found us the most flourishing people on earth, 
who have dictated public measures, and giiidcd at will 
the councils of the nation, whose system has sunk us 
to the wretched and hopeless condition in which we 
now find ourselves, are incapable of being corrected by 
experience. They are still as loud as ever in their 
plaudits of that system ; still pronounce it the greatest 
eiFort of human wisdom ; still obstinately persist, not 
merely in its support, but in its extension. The em- 
bargo then, or some measure not less destructive, 
must be of equal duration with their power. 

So inveterate are the prejudices, \vhich a long course 
of flagitious calumny has excited against the wise and 
good of America, that their warning voice, proclaim- 
ing the ruin into which our rulers were about to 
plunge us, has been raised in vain. So violent is our 
antipathy against one foreign nation, so ardent our par- 
tiality for another j so devoted are wc to those, who, 



59 

by aggravating that antipathy and soothing that partial- 
ity, flatter our most dangerous passions, that the voice 
of reason and of patriotism, demonstrating the weak- 
ness of that fatal system which has been adopted, and 
predicting the miseries which must flow from it, has 
either not been heard, or has been heard with con- 
tempt. Yet now, when we feel, that the most gloomy 
of these predictions ai"e verifying ; when the calamities 
which were foretold are beginning to press us ; when 
the intention of persevering in the same destructive 
system is openly avowed, the hope may be cherished, 
that passion will yield to sober reflection, and that 
measures may at length be estimated by their intrinsic 
value, not by a blind prejudice for or against the men 
who propose them. 

In this hope, the sufficiency of the motives which 
are assigned for the great national calamity, which our 
rulers have drawn upon us, will be briefly examined. 

The decrees of France, not only infracting the most 
solemn obligations, which can be created by treaty, 
but exhibiting also, the most inaflfable contempt for the 
sovereignty of the United States ; and the subsequent 
orders in council, issued by Britain with the avowed 
purpose of retaliating on her enemy the injuries sought 
to be inflicted on herself, are the alleged causes of this 
self-destroying measure, Although the orders of coun- 
cil were unknown, when the embargo was enacted, and 
consequently could not have contributed to produce it, 
they are now known ; and, if they would have origi- 
nally justified the measure, they would now justify its 
^continuance. I shall not, therefore, at present, avail 
myself of that circumstance. 

Postponing any comparison of these decrees and or- 
ders with each other, or any consideration of the oppo- 
site impressions, which, under the actual circumstances 
of the world, the conduct of eacn belligerent ought to 
make on a nation loving liberty, and valuing its inde- 
pendence, it is my purpose for the present, to solicit 
my fellow citizens to accompany me in the enquiry, 
whether this ruinous measure is calculated to effect 
its object, or to produce a future good, proportioned to 
those countless ills which are its inseparable attendants^ 



€0 

What object, let me first ask, was the embargo in- 
tended to effect ? In what manner, and on what, was 
It to operate ? 

To foreign nations, and sometimes to ourselves, it 
has been represented as a measure of precaution, de- 
signed only for self- protection. Of this pretext, no fo- 
reign nation has been the dupe ; nor is it believed that 
any American is so credulous, as to give it his faith — 
The safety attending those voyages, which have been 
permitted by the government, still more th:-\n the pau- 
city of the captures made on those vessels, vrhich co- 
vered the ocean when the embargo was imposed, de- 
monstrate that the danger was not so imminent as to 
require this desperate expedient. But were the fact 
otherw ise, to what does the embargo afford protection ? 
Is our surplus produce protected ? Let this question 
be answered by the agriculturist or the fisherman, whose 
market is wrested from him, and Vvho sees that surplus 
perishing on his hands. Does it save our shipping ? 
Let this question be answered by the merchant, whose 
property is rendered useless, and is rotting at our 
wharves. Does it preserve our seamen r The honest 
tar, who, with fokled arms and aching heart, contem- 
plates the ocean, from Viliich he is banished, or bids 
adieu to his family and home to search for bread in fo- 
reign service, will tell you it has ruined him. To 
whom then, of to v/hat, is its protection extended ? 
Every observing man, not infatuated by the demon of 
party, will answer— to no person and to nothing. 
Men are not served by rendering their industry unpro- 
ductive, nor is property preserved to its owners by be- 
ing rendered useless to them. It is by permitting la- 
bour to find employment, and by allowing the produce 
of labour to find a market, that real protection is afford- 
ed, and real encouragement given to the one or the 
other. 

If, in point of fact, the conduct of the belligerents 
had driven America from the ocean, and compelled - 
her to seek for safety by retiring within herself, that 
conduct cannot have compelled her to deny to her cit- 
izens the scanty privilege of selling the produce of 
their labour to those foreigners, who v/ill take upon 



61 

themselves the risk of tran sport iiig it to its place of 
consumption. If the danger of searching a foreign 
market is too great to be encountered by onrselveb ; 
il the merchants of the United States, incapable of 
*' managing their own affairs in tlieir own way, without 
*' too much regulation," have become so incompetent 
to decide on this danger, that the government must de- 
cide for them, this can afford no reason for destroying 
our home market also. Was this the real motive for 
the embargo, it would be imposed on ourselves alone, 
and the total loss of our property would be prevented by 
permi'ting us to sell to others. If motives of policy 
should induce us to exclude from our ports those who 
infract our rights, no motives, which can be avowed, 
would exclude from them those who respect our neu- 
tral privileges. They would be permitted to purchase 
and export the surplus produce of our labour. Imbe- 
cility itself could not devise as a measure of protection, 
that system of destruction, which our administnition 
has adopted. 

If we demand other evidence, than is furnished by 
the measure itself, of the motives to which i^ is to be 
ascribed, that other evidence is to be found in the lan- 
guage of government, and in the long settled opinions 
of the administration. — Any man who reads the de- 
bates in congress, who hears the sentiments uttered by 
those who possess the confiden. e of the administration, 
will perceive that the embargo is a measure, not of 
self-preservation, but of vengeance ; that it is designed 
Tiot to protect oursehes, but to coerce a foreign nation ; 
that it is not a regulation made for internal purposes, 
but is intended to operate externaily, anci to reduce to 
our feet and the feet of the merciless tyrant of th'" Eu- 
ropean continent, who has exacted similar mea^tin-es 
from all his slaves, a foreign nation, Vv'hose hurniliadon 
constitutes the first ambition of that tyrant and ofoui* 
rulers. 

To all who have adverted to the public opinions of 
public men, it is well known, that the leaders of tiie 
party now in pouer, have long been solicitous to mea- 
sure strength with Great Britain, in acomme cia! sivug. 
^le. The unprolitabie contest oi trying vikich can do 



62 

tlie GtJier the most harm^ is one in which they have long 
been most anxious to engage. It is the poiiticai hobby- 
horse which, from the adoption of our present con- 
stitution, they have been impatient to bestride. In the 
first congress, this pohcy was advocated with that zeal, 
vvhich is inspired by strong national prejudice ; and in 
1794^, the same spirit agitated the whole American peo- 
ple. The system of rejecting amicable arrangement 
with Great Britain, and of humbling that hated power 
by commercial regulations, was then urged with a fer- 
vor, wliicli was not confined within the Myalls of con- 
gress. — Jt will be recollected by all, that when the firm 
virtue and sound judgment of \Vashington checked 
this ruin-bearing system, by the nomination of Mr. 
Jay to negociate with England, the respect which had 
been felt for our patriot chief yielded to the fierce re- 
sentment of party, and this wise measure was reproba- 
ted as a sacrifice of national honour, which must infal- 
libly lead to a sacrifice of national interest also. It was 
then said, as it is now said, that America possessed the 
means of dictating to Great Britain the terms of their 
future intercou se, and that the only desideratum to 
give these means full effect, was an administration 
which would employ them. 

Equally well must be recollected, the wild fury 
vvhich was excited on laying before the public the trea-^ 
ty, in which those negociations terminated — a treaty, 
which secured the peace, and promoted the best inte- 
rests of the United States. On that occasion, as on 
this, the whole party, with one voice, exclaimed, that 
the treaty ouglit to be rejected, and commercial re- 
strictions substituted in its place ; that, had the gov- 
ernment resorted to this system of coercion, instead of 
pegoeiatiQn, the most extravagant demands which 
could \va\i^ been made by America, would have been 
conceded. 

Had the executive, as well as the legislature, been 
tlien, as now, in possession of this party, they would 
ha\e placed their country then, in the situation in which 
they have now placed it. But fortunately for the United 
States, the steady hand of Washington guided the 
helm of our pohtical barque ; and he possessed to» 



63 

much penetration, to be deceived by this intemperate 
clamour, and too anueh virtue to yield to it. He dis- 
appointed the views of this powerful party ; and a com- 
parison between our present situation and that in which 
his measures placed us, will enable us to appreciate the 
two systems. 

To these evidences of former infatuation, others of 
a more recent date may be added. The non- importa- 
tion law is a germ from the same stock. It was the 
commencement of that plan of giving lav/ to England 
by shackles on commerce, on which the heated imagi- 
nations of our rulers have so long d'Aelt. We are now 
about to witness its completion. Those who have for- 
gotten the language of the day, and Avho are willing to 
drink still deeper of the cup of humiliation, are invited 
to turn to the debates, which that subject produced. 
It is difficult, for a real American, to feel more disgust 
or mortification, than must be excited by the swagger- 
ing, bullying speeches, delivered by men, who derive 
importance from being clothed with the power of the 
American people. The language uttered by those 
who have been emphatically styled "the troops of the 
palace," on passing the act for suspending this law, is 
recommended to particular notice. It demonstrates, 
as clearly as a political truth can be demonstrated, the 
temper in which this pernicious system originated. 
i It is then most obvious, that the embargo was in- 
! tended as a measure of coercion. It remains to en- 
quire, whether, if contemplated in this point of view, 
it promises to be less impotent than when considered 
as a measure of protection. 

A FARMER, 



64 

,N0. 11. 

Th e e^t'Ct of the embargo as a measure of cocr< 
elon, is now to be considered. 

However apparent it may be, that this favourite off- 
spring of our administration was never intended to ope- 
rate against I'rance, it might be deemed a defect in the 
argument, not to contemplate the subject, with a view 
to that pouer, as weh as England. 1 will, tlierefore, 
bestow a few words on it. 

The most obsequious tool of the Great Nation can 
no longer deny, that the object of tUeir emperor is tlt^ 
conquest of the world. No man is so blind, as not to 
perceive, that to place his own followers and depend- 
ents on e^'ery throne ; to convert also into monarchies 
for their use, the few republics he has not yet overturn- 
ed ; and to reign hinibeif the emperor of emperors, and 
the king of kings, is a scheme not too extravagant for 
his gigantic ambition. Even before the publication of 
the secret treaty of Fontainbleau, in which his imperial 
majesty engaged to dispose of the United States, no 
ol)serving man, not blinded by prejudice, could be so 
infatuated as to believe, that the subjugation of this 
country formed no part of his plan. 

The only obstacle to the complete execution of this , 
splendid project^ is England ; and England could no * 
longer oppose it, were her marine superiority destroy- 
ed. The main pillar, on which this superiority must 
rest for its support, is commerce ; and to annihilate 
commerce, is to break that shield which covers what 
yet remains of liberty and national sovereignty, from 
the insatiate devourer of both. Regardless, therefore, 
of individual suffering, the great enemy of human hap^ 
piness overlooks the miseries inflicted on his own sub- 
jects, and sees in the total annihilation of commercCj 
only its ultimate effect on the British navy, and its con- 
sequent aggTandisement of himself. He cannot effect 
his object, without involving the trade of France in that 
universal destruction, which must be decreed to com- 
merce generally, in order to reach that of his enemy, 
and his measures are therefore all taken with this viewc 
It was impossible not to foresee, that his unparalleic^ 



65 

attempt to convert all neutrals into the mere instruments 
of his hostility against an adversary commanding the 
ocean, would urge that adversary to measures of reta- 
liation, which would retort with interest on his own 
subjects and vassals, the injuries designed for the ene- 
my. It was impossible not to foresee, that to the war 
he had commenced on neutral commerce, so much of 
that commerce as was carried on for France, must be- 
come the victim. Yet this consideration did not re- 
strain him. Nay more, as if fearful that the edicts of 
Britain might not completely exclude neutrals from 
French ports, he has, by other regulations, aided their 
efforts. — Had the embargo never been imposed j the 
lawless seizure and confiscation of all neutral property 
.within his reach, must eftectualiy have banished from 
his ports, every American who had not received private 
assurances of protection, and who was not so blindly 
devoted to him as to confide in those assurances. The 
total suspension of all intercourse, betvVeen France and 
other nations by sea, must then have been contempla- 
ted by her master, when he commenced this outrage- 
ous system, and was considered by him as an evil, 
•which by no means counterbalanced the advantages he 
expected to derive froni the extinction of commerce. 
The evil pressed upon the people, the advantage was 
its tendency to gratify his gigantic ambition. 

The interdiction of commerce therefore by the Uni- 
ted States, instead of cf)ercing France, is carrying into 
execution the plan of her emperor. Accordingly, we 
find him expressing his full approbation of this mea- 
sure, to us so distressing. 

Although the e.nbargo was not designed to affect 
France injuriously, the hope was unquestionably che- 
rished, that the wound it must inflict on Britain, would 
be mortal. Does any ground remain on which this 
hope can rest ? 

The medium through which it was to operate vitally 
on Great Britain, was her commerce. By withholding 
provisions from her A^^est India Islands, and ravv^ ma- 
terials from her manufactories, and by refusing to re- 
ceive her manufactures, we calculated on humblins; 

i 



66 

her proud snirit, and reducing her to our feet. This 
privation, added to that arising from the occlusion of 
every port in Kurope, while she was engaged in a 
most distressing war, it was supposed, would reduce 
her to the last extremity. 

However we might have been beguiled in the first 
Instance, by a false estimate of our own means, com- 
pared with those of other nations, experience has cer- 
tainly detected and exposed the error. We now per- 
ceive, that substitutes for the food usually supplied by 
this country can be found ; that every raw material 
can be obtained elsewhere ; and diat the markets, open 
for her manufactures, are too ample to warrant the ex- 
pectation, that the loss of ours, were it even possible 
to deprive her of it, would bring her to our feet. — 
'I'hese propositions have been so clearly demonstrated, 
both in the senate and house of representatives, that no 
mind, which is not closed against the light of reason, 
can withhold fn^m them its full assent. To the abl« 
and conclusiAC arguments that have been urged in both 
houses of congress, 1 solicit the calm and deliberate 
attention of every American, who wishes to judge cor- 
rectly of the present alarming crisis, and to take an ac- 
curate view of the true interests of his country. He 
will fmd strong and solid grounds for the opinion, that 
die evils inflicted on Great Britain by the embargo, 
are compensated by the advantages she derives from 
that measure. Were it submitted to her to determine 
whether it should be continued or removed, the ques- 
tion, which alternative her immediate interests would 
incline her to embrace, presents a problem not easy of 
solution. Most clearly it does not ix)ssess such coer- 
cive qualities as to iixluce a surrender of those princi- 
ples on which her maritime superiority depends, or a 
relinquishment of that retaliating system, which she 
has on great deliberation adopted. The former would 
destroy her national grandeur, and with it her national 
existence ; and the latter, by acknowledging her inabi- 
lit\ to reto* t upon France the injuries which that nation 
seeks to inflict, by violating every principle of public 
lav/, would be to meet naked and unarmed an enemy 
holding an unlawful weapon, which he had both thft 



gkill and disposition to ^vield with infinite force. '• 
However earnestly our rulers may wish these results, 
they can no longer be so infatuated as to expect them. 
Were this experiment on our ability to humble 
Great Britain as little injurious to ourselves as to her, 
it might be of equal duration with the enmity of our 
rulers. However impolitic it might be deemed by 
those, who entertain just conceptions of the danger to 
be apprehended from France, they would bear with si- 
lent resignation an evil, for which there would be no 
.l^medy. But this measure, so impotent as it respects 
foreign powers, operates with m( st destructive energy 
upon ourselves. From a high degree of active anima- 
tion, in which every mental and corporeal pov\er might 
be exerteti to great national and individual advantage, 
it has reduced us, while yet in the vernal season of 
youth, to a state of death-like torpor, in which the 
choicest functions of our political being are suspended. 
The sources both of national and individual Avcalth, 
which were lately so abundant, if not absolutely dried 
up, have their streams forced out of those cnannels 
which mieht fertilize our country. Public and private 
revenue are equally destroyed. The same blow has 
annihilated both. Every member of the community 
who had any thing to lose, perceives and feels the 
calamity. 

I will not dwell on that distress in which all partici- 
pate, and of which all are sensible. No representation 
can equal the reality, nor make any impression which 
the pressure of the evil has not made. On that sub- 
ject only one remark will be hazarded. The importation 
of necessaries has not yet been stopped, and to a con- 
I siderable extent the embargo has been evaded. To 
!. these causes are to be ascribed that languid cun'ent, 
i Ivhich still creeps through our political system. These 
causes are now to be removed, and their removal will 
be followed by total stagnation. Hitherto the produce 
of our labour, though greatly depressed, has sold for 
something. Let the system be perfected, and it will 
command no price whatever — circulation must stop. 

Though I mean not to dilate on the evils we feel, I 
j m\i invite the thinking p^rt of the community to reflect 



68 

on those whicli, if less obA'ious, are not, I fear, less 
certain. 

'I'he most valuable staples of the United States are 
the growth of other countries, and can be furnished by 
them in great al^undancc. The commercial state of 
the M'orld is undergoing a re^•olution, which, notwith- 
standing our utmost care and circumspection, will pro- 
bably raise up powerful competitors in those branches 
of industry, of which we have hitherto possessed al- 
n;iost the monopoly. By withdrawing our commodi- 
ties from the market, we surrender it to our rivals, 
give a forced acceleration to their progress, and put 
them in immediate possession of a trade they might be 
a long time in acqui'ing. It is possible, that we mi.y 
recover it in part, but it is scarcely possible^ that it can 
ever be completely restored to us. The mischiefs 
drawn upon us by the blind prejudice of our rulers, 
will probably be felt fcr ages to come. 

But our self-inflicted injuries are not exclusively of 
a pecuniary nature. To the view of the statesman, 
others present themselves, which, though less imme-' 
diritely felt, are not less to be deprecated. Not only 
will the moral principle of our merchants be tainted, by 
inviting them to evasions of tlie law, but the whole 
mass of the people will be infected by those demorali- 
zing regulations, which, if not rendered inevitable, 
w^ill at least find an apology in our situation. To re- 
lieve the, great body of debtors from that distress which 
is created by taking from labour its profit, the admi- 
nistration of justice is, in several states, already divert- 
ed from its usual course ; and that sense of the obliga- 
tion of contracts, uhich our constitution has contribu- 
ted so much to strengthen, and on which national pros- 
perity so much depends, if not absolutely destroyed, 
must be grai' ly impaired. Inattention to engagements 
\y^\\ become habitual ; debt will be augmented by the 
accumuhtion of interest ; while the means of discharg- 
ing it will be di.-isip.ited : the hope of being absolved 
from it other\\ise than by payment, will be created ; 
and those strugf^lco betu een the debtor and creditor, 
which are so fata to republics, and which we witness- 
ed in the interval between the conclusion of the war 



69 

for independence and the adoption of our constitution, 
will l>e revived. 

A precedent for this individual depravity will, it is 
much to be feared, be found in the example of the go- 
vernment. The ordinary resources of -revenue being 
dried up, the fairest claims on the nation 'will be disre- 
garded, and its most solemn engagements violated. 

It is not amona: the least of the evils which mav rea- 
sonably be apj)rthended, that the oppressive measures 
, devised for the execution of this oppressive system, 
will gradually deaden the sense of real liberty^ and ac- 
custom the American people to a despotism of the 
most ferocious kind — the despotism of fliction. The 
fiercer passions will be kindled mto a flame, will mag- 
nify petty offences into enormous crimes, and in order 
to gratify the malignity of party rage, will prostrate all 
those barriers which defend and preserve freedom. — 
Nor ought the danger that we are rushing into a war 
with Britain, to be lightly estimated. The ordinary 
calamities incident to such a v/ar, form the sn\allest 
objection to it : It leads infallibly to a still closer con- 
nection with France, and the independence of no na- 
tion has survived an alliance with that power. Her 
friendship is still more formidable than her enmity. 

These are the evils, in which a perseverance in the 
system commenced by our rulers, must involve the 
United States. And for what valuable purpose shall 
we encounter them ? Let it be admitted, that our 
embargo, in some degree, impairs the resources of 
Great Britain, and that it is our true interest so to do ; 
yet the injuries it inflicts on her, can bear no proportion 
to those it heaps on ourselves. What should we say 
of the individual who, fmding himself seized by a per- 
son standing behind him, should pass his sword through 
his own body, that its point might scratch his ad- 
versary ? 

That the individuals, whose foreign prejudices and 
erroneous calculations have drawn upon their country 
the difficulties and embarrassments we now experience, 
should desijerately plunge forward into still deeper dif- 
ficulties and more perplexing embarrassments, may 
be accounted for from the obstinate and personal pride 



70 

of men, who would feel a diminution of importance 
from the acknowledgment, thut themselves or their 
idol were fallible. But the mass ot the people feel not 
the same inducements to persevere in error. How- 
ever misguidrd they may be, they intend to promote 
the prosperif) ot their country. However severe ihe 
pressure, they are taught by those to whom they have 
given their confidence, to beheve that national honour 
requires a prolongation of national sufi'ering. In this 
behef, they bear with patience the worse than useless 
burden which their rulers have imposed on them. 

The sentiment is too laudible not to be treated with 
respect. Mistaken as is its application, weak as are 
the pretensions of the advocates of the present sj'-stem, 
to be the real guardians of national honour, the subject 
demands, and shall receive, a dispassionate conside- 
ration. 

A FARMER. 



71 

NO. in. 

The question now to be discussed, is this — Does 
the honour of the United States demand a persexenaice 
in that system, which our rulers have adopted, and are 
still pursuing ? 

A question more important to the American people, 
one which ought more to engage the attention of the 
patriot and the statesman, cannot be propoijed. For, 
in my judgment, national honour and natioriui mterest, 
can never be in opposition to each other. However 
the case of the moment may be consulted, a natiori 
can never promote its real interest, by the abandon- 
ment of its honour. But it is genuine honour, which 
maintains this higii rank in the catalogue of national 
virtues ; not that spurious honour, M'hich with its de- 
ceptive light beguiles, like an ignis fatuiis, those who 
trust themselves to its guidance, from the true path 
leading to happiness, into irremediable perdition. 

In what does this genuine honor consist ? Certainly 
not in an obstinate adherence to error. If measures 
have been adopted which disappoint the hopes of their 
projectors, and instead of producing the advantages at- 
tached to them by a feverish and sublimated imagina- 
tion, have a direct tendency to ruin the nation ; ho- 
nour can never require, that we should bind our desti- 
nies to ^those measures, and perish rather than change 
them. If in private life an individual, wearied with 
the prosperity, which resulted from conducting his af- 
fairs in the usual Way, should devise some new systemj 
and stake his reputation on its success, no wise man 
would think, that honour renuired a pertinacious' per- 
severance in that s} stem, after experience had demon- 
strated that, instead of fulfilling his visionary expecta- 
tions, it was leadinar him to certain destruction. His 
Ow^n pride might induce him to embrace rum rather 
than give up his pretensions to infallibility, but every 
reasonable man would think him a subject more proper 
for the mad house than for imitation. InfeUibility is 
the attribute of the Deity, not of man ; and honour can 
ne^•cr require, that our actions ^should be regulated on 



72 

the presumption, that We possess a quality which be- 
long-s not CO onr nature. 

hince absolute exemption from error is denied 
to us, true wisdom and true honour are best consulted 
bv correcting, with the least possible injury, any false 
step we may have made. If we have lost our way, we 
cannot too quickly turn back and take the right road. 
Every sten we take in the wrong one, carries us fur- 
ther "from our pkice of destination. The guide who 
has misled us, may stiil insist, that we ought to follow 
him ; but as travellers, it is our interest to retrace our 
steps, and to recover the path from which we have 
wandered. We c-A\ on foreign nations to retrace their 
steps, and have never supposed that they would de- 
grade themselves by so doing. Why ihen should 
America be self-degraded, by changing a rash measure 
inconsiderately adopted ? Is America the only power 
on earth whose errors no experience can be permitted 
to correct, or who would be disgraced by admitting 
the possibility that our rulers may be fallible ? 

I discard then altogether the position, that national 
honour requires us to adhere to the system of annihila- 
ting our commerce, merely br cause we have adopted 
that system, iis wisdom is still a proper subject for 
consideration, and we can now consider it with the 
lights furnished by experience. 

Since the question, what course does national honour 
require us to pursue, is not closed forever, but may be 
freely examined, unprejudiced by the experiments 
which our theorists have made, I intreat my fellow 
citizens to reflect v. ell on the principle, which ought to 
guide them in deciding it. 

We may define national honour, in the actual case to 
which it is now applied, to be a reasonable and firm 
assertion of oiir independence, and of our unquestion- 
able rv^hi?,, by a judicious exertion of the best means 
we have the power to employ. 

In exploring the field opened to us by this definition, 
it becomes essentially necessary, to take a rapid view 
of the relative situation and designs of the bellige- 
rents, of their conduct respectively towards the Uni- 
ted States, and of their motives for that conduct. 



This view will aid us in marking out that course^ 
which ought to be pursued by ourscives. 

The person executing this task v/ould be unfaithful 
to his duty, if he sought to coiiioim his statements to 
pubhc prejudice, rather than to the facf Widi truth 
for his guide, he must represent things as they are, 
not as the passions of party have painted tliem. If he^ 
is ciiarged with want of attachment to his ov\ n country, 
the charge will be unfounded, for impartiality of state- 
ment does not imply indifference of feeling. The for- 
mer is necessary to a clear perception of our real inte- 
rests ; the latter, were we even in the wrong, would 
be criminal- 
France is essentially a military nation. Her genius 
is tT»ilitary. Her character, therefore, leads to con- 
quest, and her power is to be extended by the subju- 
gation dt other nations. Ttie connection she seeks 
with them, is to be maintained by force, not bj* a re- 
ciprocity of interests. 

Britain, on the contrary, is a Commercial, and can- 
not become a military nation. Her territory is immu- 
taljly limited by the ocean, and she cannot extend it. 
Commerce, not conquest, is, from necessity, her ob- 
ject. For this purpose sh<e plants distant colonies, and 
exercises dominion over remote regions, which may 
be protected by her fieets,' and in which her power may 
be maintained without large armies, i er connection 
with other nations is cemented by mutual interest, and 
must be dissolved when that mutual interest ceases to 
preserve it. 

The natural tendency of the French character to con*> 
quest, is fully developed, and is pushed to its exrreme 
point, by the consummate soldier, whose chains arc 
worn throughout the continent of Kuroj:)e. He has 
exhibited himself also without a mask. The slave of 
no passion but of his gigantic ambition ; incapabk of 
behig diverted from his object by any sentiment of ho- 
nour or feeling of humanity ; patient and impetuous by* 
turns ; uatchingwith a penetrating eye over all the other 
powtrs, he discerns and turns to account tiieir vices 



y 



74 

or weaknesses, and employs indifferently, force and 
fraud, terror and seduction, for the accomplishment of 
his grand scheme of universal dominion. No submis- 
sion can preserve his friendship, and every ally be- 
comes his vassal. He acknowledges no other connec- 
tion than that of master and slave, nor can any thing 
but open and manly resistance rescue any portion of 
the earth from his grasp. His promises are cobwebs, 
"which he breaks at pleasure, and his faith is plighted 
only for the more sure destruction of those who trust 
to it. 

The genius, the resources, and the character of the 
two nations, and of the chief of one of them, have givena 
character to the war, which they wage agamst each 
other. On the part of France, it is a war of choice, 
a war of conquest, a war which has for its object the 
total extinction of the British power, as a necessary 
step to the conquest of the world. 

On the part of Great Britain, it is a war of necessity, 
which she could not avoid, and cannot terminate ; a 
war for existence ; a war on which depends her own 
liberty, and that of other nations — Let France succeed, 
and who is so infatuated as to believe, that there re. 
mains on earth a power, which can place limits to his 
ambition ? Let Britain succeed, and she only pre- 
serves herself and the world. She makes nr- conquests, 
and can make none. On France she could make na 
impression. The whole continent of Europe would 
still be impenetrable by her arms, and every part of it 
Avould still exhibit a force she could not be frantic 
enough to encounter. 

The character of the war, the character andthe designs 
©f the belligerents, ought to be kept in view during the 
examination of their conduct towards the United States. 
This examination will be confined to those measures, 
w hich have been adopted during the present war, and 
which affect our sovereignty and our neutral rights— 
A more extensive range is declined, not because it 
would produce a different result, but because it would 
lead to a length of enquiry, transcending the plan of 
these essays. 



75 

, The decree rendered at Berlin by the emperor of 
jFrancc, in November, 1806, claims our first attention. 
In violation of the established law of nations and of so- 
lemn treaties, this decree declares all the dominions of 
Great Britain in a state of blockade, prohibits all inter- 
course with those dominions, and all commtrce in ar- 
ticles of their growth or manufacture. The extrava- 
gance of this edict is augmented, by the consideration, 
that the blockaded country was the mistress of the 
ocean, while the blockading power was unable to sta- 
tion a squadron before any single port of her enemy.-— 
The act then is an undisguised attack on the sovereign- 
ty of neutrals, and an unequivocal invasion of their 
rights. It is attended by no palliating circumstance, 
and is alike incapable of being excused or misunder^ 
stood. It is an authority to French cruisers to com- 
mit indiscriminate plunder, and the robbery it licences 
can be justified by no plausible pretext. 

By those who can find nothing to censure in the con- 
duct of Bonaparte, it is pretended, that Kngia d has 
been herself the first to avow the principle of proclama- 
tion blockades, and ^o carry it into practice. 

So far as respects any avowal of the British govern- 
ment, this assertion is positively untrute. The princi- 
ple is not, and never has been avowed. No instance 
exists, in which it has been re ognized, as the rule by 
which that nation would regulate its conduct, Tlie 
reverse is the fact, The British doctrine has uniformly 
been, that a blockade to be lawful, must be eftectiye. 

The practice under the rule, docs not admit of such 
complete demonstration. From the nature of the thing, 
the force which shall constiute an effective blockade, 
is susceptible of no precise definition. It may vary ac- 
cording to circumstances ; and impartial men may dif- 
fer with respect to the fact. It is certain, that a very 
extensive coast has been declared in a state of blockade. 
The legitimacy of the order, depends on the force em- 
ployed in its e:j;ecution. What this force was, is a 
matter of evidence on which few in this country are en- 
abled to decide. Thus much I think may, without 
fear of contration, be hazarded. The naval power €>f 



76 

Britain is sufficient for snch an effective blockade, of 
every port from Brest to the mouth of the i^lbe, as to 
render the attempt to enter any of them manifestly dan^ 
gerous. No evidence has yet been furnished, tlrit such 
was not the fact, while that coast was blockaded ; and 
to pronounce this decision without evidence, is cer- 
tainly assuming what we have no ni?;ht to assume. 

it is also to be recollected, /that these measures of 
blockade on the part of ■ na-land, s:rew out of measures 
previously taken by France, which are not sanctioned 
by the laws and usages of nations. She undertook to 
p ohibitthe introdaction of British goods into the con- 
tinent of Rurope, not only through her own dominions, 
but throup;h those of other nations, some of vv-hich 
professed to be neutral. This prohibition extended to 
iieutral, as well as bel!iL';erent bottoms. In this res- 
pect, France uufjuestiorably transcended those rights, 
which war is admitted to give ; and even that part of 
the prohibition, which may in strictness be deemed le- 
gitimate, is a very harsh and unusual exercise of belli- 
gerent privileges. It might be expected to be retort- 
ed by a hiirsh exercise of belligerent rights on the part 
of Great Britain. But the enquiry v.ill not be further 
pursued, because it is manifest, that the contest on 
this subject can furnish no apology fc/r the Berlin 
decree. 

This exterminating war then, upon neutral com- 
merce, under \\'hlch the trade of the United Stctes is 
doomed to expire, was obviously commenced by 
France. It will appear the less excusable, and will 
exhibit in stronger colours the haughty and despotic 
character of the tyra'it widi whom this system origina- 
ted, if the advaiUaj^es derived by the beiligerents res- 
pectively fro n tlie trade which he has annihilated, be 
tai.Oii into consideration. 

So decided s the superiority of Great Britain on the 
ocean, *hat her enemies scarcely venture to spread a 
canvass on th't ele4nent. To neutrals, therefore, al- 
most exclusively, was France indebted for the expor- 
tarion of her ^^'ines and brandies, and for the importa- 
tion of those rich colonial products, which habit has 



77 

lendered essential to com'brtable existence. Britain, 
oii the coiitrary, owes nothing to neutial bottoms. 

■^Her own conimtrcial n.ar ne is equal to all her purpo- 
ses, and she asks no aid from foreij^n navigation. Yet 
France, thus benefitted by neutral commerce, has 
sough, to exterminate it by an act of violence, which 
mi gilt be expected to convert every independent neu- 
tral into a mortiil foe. 

If t lis outrage on public la'v, and on the sovereign- 
'ty of navions, had spent its force on neutrals', it could 
have conferred no right on other belligerents to 
adopt similar measures. But such is not the fact. 
The object of the Berlin decree was to wound Great 

'• Britain, and its effect, if submitted to, would be not 
only an iusult to her sovereignty, but a permanent in- 
jury to her interests also. 

Although France was unable to carry this decree 
into complete execution, she was able so far to exe- 
cute it, as to divert into her own ports a considerable 
portion of that neutral commerce, which was usually 
destined for England, and to introduce into France 
those valuable articles which are imported from the 
Indies, on better terms than they could be introdu- 
ced into England. No belligerent, especially one 
warring for existence, can be expected to submit to such 
a state of things. If she possesses tlie means of re- 
torting upon her enemy the injuries intended for 
herself, she will employ them. The suffering neu- 
tral ought, in justice, to ascribe the calamities re- 
sulting from such a contest, to the power which 
commences it. 

But to estimate rightly the relative demerits of 
France and England in this respect, a more full 
view ought to be taken of the subject. The inter- 
diction of neutral navigation by Bonaparte, is not to 
be contemplated as a single insulated fact. It is part of 
a system, it is a link of that great chain of violence, by 
which he hopes so to shackle and confine the commerce 
of England, as to enfeeble the sinews of her maritime 
strength, and finally to overturn her maritime powen 
It is ©bvious, that from her manufactures and com- 



78 

merce, Britain derives the means of supporting that im- 
mense navy, which ejiables her to defend herself, and to 
place some hmits to the enormous power of France. 
Deprive her of every market for these manufactures, 
destroy this commerce, and you dry up the sour- 
ces, which nourish and recruit her navy, and leave 
it to perish lor want of support. 

Arduous as this attempt may appear, it was not 
too dlHicult for Bonaparte. From every power on 
the continent of l.urope he exacts, as the indispen- 
sable price of a precarious and temporary existence, 
implicit obedience to his mandate on this favourite 
point. I'heir ports must be shut, not only to Bri- 
tish commerce, but to British manufactures also. — 
To complete rhis stupendous plan, and close every 
avenue through which British manufactures might 
pass into other countries, the Berlin decree was is. 
sued, by which the British dominions were declared 
to be in a state of blockade, and all articles of the 
growth or manufacture of those dominions, found 
on land or in neutral bottoms, \vere declared to be 
good prize. This system, if carried into complete 
execiition, would obviously prostrate his enemy at 
his feet. For its complete execution, he relied 
much on his actual power, and much on his influence 
o/er those states whom his power could not immc» 
diately reach, but who trembled at its approach. 

Was it to be expected, that Great Britain would 
become the quiet and unresisting victim of a sys- 
tem, aimed so directly and so obviously at her 
safety ? Could she be required not to oppose the 
whole system by such a counter-system, as, in her 
judgment, would defeat its object ? If self preserv- 
ation be the primary law of nature, I know not on 
what principle those neutrals, who have not resisted 
with eilect, so far as was in their power, this gross 
infraction of their rights, this arbitrary assumption 
of their sovereignty, and attempt to convert them 
into the mere instruments of hostility against a 
nation fip^hting for existence, in the cause of hu- 
intin liberty, can consider that nation as the ag- 



79 

gressor, when she cVfends herself by those measures 
jaf retaliation that are within htr reach. 
' ' y.^^' ^f ^^^ attend to the language of our ad- 
ministration, to the debates in con<.ress, to the 
Sentiments retailed to the people through the nii- 
nistericil presses, we should lose sight of France, 
and consider Great Britain as the original aggres- 
sor — ^as the principal, if net the sole offender l' 

A FARMER. 



80 

NO, ir. 



x\ 



That a neutral tnay permit itself to be used as • 
an insLiuiiient of hostility by i^ie belligerent a^^ainst 
anoiher, without fofeiting its neutral chaacter, has not 
been in terms asserted ; but it is .illeged by those who, 
overlooking tlie aggressions of France, labour to turn 
all our resentments against England, that the United , 
States have never permitted themselves to be so used. 
In sup,,ort of this assertion, it is contended, that, un!il 
the condemnation of the Horizon, the United States had 
a right to consider the Berlin decree as inapplicable to j 
th'-m, and consequer.tly were not bound to manifest a \ 
determination to resist ir. The orders of November, ^■ 
1807, therefore, these politicians say, derive neither 
justification ixor excuse from the previous measures of 
France. I 

Let this assertion be candidly investigated, ^ 

That the Berlin decree does, in its terms, as posi- ^ 
tively include the United States, as if they had been j 
exiiressly i^.amed, must be acknowledged by all who J 
have read that docimient. When language is ambi- \ 
guous, we m.a}' justifiably suspend our opijiions of the j 
intention of the person u^ing it, until that intention i 
shall be explainecl ; but when the terms used are un- ^ 
equivocal ; ^vhcn they can import but one sense ; they ") 
must be taken in that sense, unless there are well foun- \ 
ded moii\'es for believing, that they have been employ- a 
ed inadvertantly ; in whicli case, prudence requires, | 
that the person or the nation they implicate, should \ 
take immediate and decisive steps to obtain satisfactory J 
explanations ; and should, in the mcjU time, prepare I 
for the event of the resolution being construed accor- .' 
ding to its expression. \ 

The decree of Berlin, on its face, furnishes no J 
ground for the hope, that those terms, which compre- 
hend the Uni'cd States, were inadvertently or unin- 
tentionally eip.ployed. Let us then enquire, whether 
there are any extrinsic circumstances to warrant a con- 
struction in direct opposition to the plain language of J 
the instrument itself. *- 



81 

On the day preceding that, on which the decra& 
bears date, the report, on which it was founded, was 
made to the emperor by his minister of exterior rela- 
tions. This report, after the usual declamation about 
British tyranny and injustice, recommends that the 
: British Isles be declared in a state of blockade ; that 
i every Englishman be made a prisoner of war ; and 
I that all English property be confiscated. The report 
jthen proceeds — *' Since England has resolved on anni- 
*' hilating all industry on the continent, whoever car- 
" ries on a trade in English merchandize, favours her 
*' designs to the utmost of his power, and becomes 
*' her accomplice. Let all trade in English merchan- 
** dize be declared illegal." 

The universality of the phrases employed, derives 
additional force from the object contemplated, and from 
the particular means relied on to effect that object 
The avowed object was, the anmihilation of the trade 
and manufactures of Great Britain ; and a proclama- 
tion of blockade is intended exclusively for neutrals* 
How then could the declaration, that all who traded in 
English merchandize should be considered as the ac- 
complices of England, and that such trade was illegal, 
be understood to exclude that neutral, who traded in 
English merchandize more than any and every other ? 
In his letter of the 24th November, 1807, to general 
Armstrong, the minister thus exposes the absurd fal- 
lacy of such an opinion : — " His majesty regrets, with- 
*' out doubt, to have been forced to recur to such 
*' measures. He knows all that the commercial class- 
*' es may have to suffer in consequence of them, par- 
*' ticularly those, who, having habitual relations with 
*' England, using a common language, and often mix- 
*' ing their interests, might more frequently occasion 
an apprehension of some commercial connivance 
with the English, inasmuch as they would have 
greater facilities in covering it. This circumstance 
made it necessary to use to\yards them precautions 
more exact, and an increasing watchfulness, in or- 
der not to be exposed to abuses, which might resul.t- 
from a less constant vigilance." 

L 



The policy adopted by France, is here acknowled" 
js-ed to be such, that its appHcation to the United States 
must be still more rigorous than to other nations. 

The decree itself was framed in the spirit and in the 
broad terms of the report, and was instantly carried 
into execution, \mder the immediate inspection of 
the emperor. English goods imported' into neutral 
countries, and neutral vessels which had come from 
England, were seized so soon as those countries were 
occupied by the French, without excepting those ves- 
sels and goods which belonged to American citizens 
from the general calamity. On the 24th of November, 
three days after the date of the Berlin decree, it was 
notified to the nominally free city of Hamburgh. 
From this notification the following extract is tal^en : — 
*' All English merchandize that may be found in the 
*' city, in the harbour, or on the territory of Hamburgh, 
*' no matter to w/iom they may belongs shall be confis- 
*' cated." — In conformity with this notification, Ame- 
rican property to a great amount \\'as seized. 

This was a practical and unequivocal application of 
the decree to the United States. 

This arbitrary edict was announced by order of his 
imperial majesty, to his vassal kings ; and measures 
for carrying it into execution were adopted by them. 
From the decree made on this occasion, by the most 
degraded of them, (die king of Spain,) the following 
extract is taken : — " So likewise will be confiscated, 
*' all merchandize which may be met with, although it 
" may be met %mth in neutral vessels ^ whenever it is 
" destined for the ports of England, or her Isles." — 
It is admitted by our administration, that American 
vessels were capturtd under this decree. 

The circumstances of the world were opposed to the 
opinion, that the Berlin decree might be construed, 
against its letter and spirit, in favour of the United 
States. 

The then nominally neutral commercial powers of 
Europe, were Portugal and Denmark. The latter 
certainly had claims to an exemption from the opera- 
tion of this measure, which were not infererior to any 
that could be advanced by this country. Her treaty 



83 

was equally violated by It, and her partiality for France 
Jiad been as undisguised. Yet it has never been sus- 
pected that Denmark was not included in it. The 
.merchant vessels of Denmark and Portugal united, did 
not carry half the British goods that were carried m 
American vessels. Consequently the motives which 
induced the decree, urged its application to the United 
JStates, much more strongly than to any other neutral. 
. Every probability then was against the opinion, that 
'a decree, w^hich, in its terms comprehended the Uni- 
ted States with other neutral powers, would not be ap- 
plied to them. Every extrinsic circumstance concur- 
red with the language of the instrument, to prove that 
it was designed for the United States. 

But it has been alleged, that the answer of the min- 
ister of marine and colonies, to an application made by 
general Armstrong, in December, 1806, was suffi- 
ciently explicit to quiet the United States, and to satis- 
fy Great Britain. 

It can scarcely be denied, even by the administra- 
tion, that a decree, so positive and unequivocal as that 
of Berlin, ought to be satisfactorily explained away 
only by language equally positive and unequivocal. 
The United States had a right to demand, and ought 
to have demanded, an express and public declaration 
from the proper authority, that this edict was inappli- 
cable to them ; nor ought they to have been satisfied 
with any inferior explanation. To have reposed with 
implicit and unsuspecting confidence, on declarations 
of a totally different character, is to become the willing 
dupe of those declarations, and can be justified by no 
government to the people whom it rules. 

Was the letter of Mr. Decres of this explicit and sa- 
tisfactory description ? Quite the reverse. It abounds 
in evasions and subterfuge. 

In his first paragraph he says—" I consider the im- 
" perial decree of the 21st of November last, as thus 
** far, conveying no modification of the regulations at 
** present observed in France, with regard to neutral 
" navigation, nor cc^nsequently of the convention of 
*« the 30th of September, 1800, with the United States 
** ©f America.'* 



84 

It ought not to have escaped our administration, nor 
cbuld it have escaped that of Great Britain, that no dis- 
tinction is here made between the United States and 
other neutral powers. The decree is understood to. 
apply to them in the same manner as to others. The 
declaration, then, that Great Britain and her dominions 
were in a state of blockade ; that all trade with them 
was unlawful ; that every vessel laden with a cargo of 
the growth or manufacture of her dominions, although 
a neutral, might be captured, and was, with her cargo, 
liable to confiscation ; was either inapplicable to any 
neutral, or was applicable to the United States. If 
these regulations were inapplicable to neutrals, for 
whom were they designed ? — certainly not for belligc'- 
tents. 

It ought to have occurred to all having an interest in 
the subject, that this absurd construction could not 
safely be put on the answer of the French minister. 
That he might explain the whole sentence by declar- 
ing, that he considered the blockade of England, noti- 
fied by his imperial master, as a legitimate blockade ; 
and then, ''without any modification of the regulations 
' *' observed in France, with regard to neutral naviga- 
** tion," all the penalties imposed by the decree on 
that "navigation," would necessarily follow. 

Although he deems this a sufficient answer to the 
questions propounded by Mr. Armstrong, he proceeds 
afterwards to be more particular, but not to be less 
evasive. The first article of the decree, he says, fur- 
nishes "no reason lo^' enquiring what interpretation, or 
" restriction, or extension may be given to it." 

2d. " Seizures, contrary to the present regulations, 
" concerning cruising, shall not be allowed to the 
" captors " 

AVhat \vere the then "present regulations concerning 
" cruising ?" Did the Berlin decree form a part 
of them ? At any rate, did they not subject to capture 
and condemnation every vessel trading to a blockaded 
port, or in prohibited articles ? But whether these 
subterfuges were intended or not, this answer insinu- 
ates no discrimination between American and other 
neutral bottoms. 



85 

3(1. " That an American vessel cannot be taken at 
'^ sea for the mere reason, that she is g' ing to a port of 
" England, or returning from one ; because, conform-' 
" able with the 7th article of the said decree, we are 
*' limited in France not to admit vessels coming from 
*' Engl !nd, or the English colonies." 

The style of this observation is not that of a minister, 
speaking from authority, but that of a man reasoning 
on an instrument, with no other information than was 
furnished by the instrument itself; and the reasoning 
is most obviously false. There is certainly no incom- 
patibility between two articles in the same decree • 
the one subjecting a neutral to capture on the high 
seas, for trading with England ; and the other, subject- 
ing the same vessel to seizure in the ports of France. 

But it cannot escape observation, that Mr. Decres 
says only, that a vessel cannot be taken for the mere 
reason that she is going to, or returning from a port of 
Englan^l ; he does not add, or for the reason, that her 
cargo consists of articles of the growth or manufacture 
of Great Britain. It is also observable, that the reasons 
he assigns for his opinion, are precisely as applicable to 
the vessels of other neurals, as to tho-ic of America. — 
If he did believe the decree' to be inapplicable to the 
United States, it was because they were neutrals, not 
because its terms furnished any exception in their 
favour. 

The fourth and last article of this celebrated letter, 
relates only to particular articles of the decree, and will 
be found not to be more satisfactory than tliose which 
preceded it. Like the third, it is a]:)narentlv tl^e mere 
reasoning of an individual, l^iavingnoinforn ation from 
his government, and no authority to declare its in- 
tentions. 

Never was a more evasive and equivocal answer 
given on so interesting a subject, nor one which less 
warranted the opinion which has been avowed, in con- 
sequence of it. There is certainly no part of it, which 
insinuates the idea, that any discrimination ^vas intend- 
ed between the United States and other neutrals. 
As if some secret respect for character, induced Mr. 
Decres to secure i\im,self against the future ini[mtation 



8^ 

of duplicity, he adds — ''but it would be proper, that 
" } our excellency should communicate wiJi the min- 
" ister ot' exterior relations, as to what concerns the 
*' correspondence oithe citizens of the United States 
" with Kngland." 

Had the answer been as explicit as it is ambiguous ; 
had it in piaui terms averred the opinion, that the Ber- 
lin decree was inapplicable ; this reference was suffi- 
cient to strip it of all authority, and to make the opinion 
that of a mere unauthorised individual, not that of his 
goveniment. Mr. Madison's letter of the 22d of May 
1807, evinces, that he so understood this reference. 

If this letter justified, in the judgment of the presi- 
dent, the opinion which he has professed, even in an 
oHicial message to congress, whence is it, that he has 
never, even m his letters to general Armstrong, re- 
j)roac]ied the French government with duplicity ? 
That the letters of the secretary of state exhibit no such 
charge, warrants the conclusion, either, that he thinks 
it could not l)e supported, or that the administration 
prefers the imputation on itself of excessive credulity, 
to the odious task of taxing his imperial majesty with 
deception. 

Is it possible, that our executive can have been satis- 
fied with this answer ? Can they possibly have believ- 
ed, that a nation struggling for existence, and having 
a deep interest in the subject to which it related, 
\\ ould, or ought, to have been satisfied with it ? 

It must be admitted, that the letter of Mr. Decres, 
furnished no justifiable (ground for the opinion, that 
any exception from the Berlin decree, in favour of the 
United States, was meditated by his master. But it 
is allcdgcd, that in point of fact, it was never applied 
to the United States, until late in October, 1807, when 
tlK Horizon was finally condemned ; and that, till 
then, there was no reason for believing that it Avould 
be so applied, 

'i'his extraol ■" lary assertion, has been made for the 
purpose of supj. 'ng the no less extraordinary decla- 
ration, tluit the orcLcis of council were issued at a time, 
wlien it was not known in England that the Berlin de- 
cree would be applied to the United States. No othr 



87 

moa\e can be conjectured for taking the final condem- 
nation of the Horizon, instead of the declaration of the 
emperor, made in the preceding September. To an 
official application on the subject, he answered, that 
" as he did not think proper to express any exception 
" in his decree, there is no ground for making any in 
*' its execution, in relation to whomsoever." — This 
answer having been as public as it was decisive, must 
have been immediately known to the British cabinet, 
and must consequently have removed every doubt, if 
any before existed, respecting the construction of the 
decree to which it related. 

But the idea, that a regulation, which in terms com- 
prehends the United States, may be considered as i;-- 
applicable to them until executed by a judicial sen- 
tence, is as novel as it is absurd. Admit this princi- 
ple, and the orders of council are not yet in force 
against America. But the principle is intended for 
French decrees only, and is dropped wlien those of the 
enemies of his imperial majesty come into view. Un- 
questionably, the promulgation of such a decree, is its 
application to the United States, and the first capture 
of a vessel or seizure of property under it, is its ex- 
ecution. 

That the property of American citizens was seized 
under this decree, immediately after its publication, is 
notorious— and that captures were soon made under 
it, is admitted. The Horizon herself was captured in 
May, 1807 ; and the secretary of state, in his letter to 
Mr. Armstrong, of May, 1807, observes — "there are 
*' proofs that the West India privateers have, under 
** colour of the edict, committed depredations, which 
" will constitute just claims of redress from their gov- 
*' ernment."— In his letter of the 6th of January, 1807, 
to Mr. Erskine, lord viscount Howick, speaking of 
the Berlin decree, says—" You will state to the Ame- 
*' rican government, that his majesty relies with confi- 
" dence on their good sense and firmness, in resisting 
*' pretensions, which, if suffered to take effect, must 
** prove so destructive to the commerce of ail neutral 
" nations. His majesty has learnt, that the measures 
" announced in thtdQcrcc have already , in some instan- 



88 

*' C€S, been carried into executio?i by the primteers of the 
" enlniy ; unci there could be no doubt, but his majes- 
" ty v.ould liave an undisputed right to exercise a just 
*' retaliation." 

Captures under this decree, . tlien, had been made m 
the European seas previous to the month of January, 
1807, and in the West Indian seas previous to the 
month of May, in the same year. Yet no disposition 
to resist it was ever manifested. No resentment ap- 
pears to have been excited by it On the contrary, a 
treaty ner^otiated with Great Britain was returned with- 
out being^laid before the senate, and one of the most 
decisive objections to it, was, that the British minister^ 
at the time of his signature, addressed a note to the 
American negoilators, declaring that his government 
did not mean to rcUnquish its right to retaUate on 
France this atrocious outra.2;e on neutral rights, if 
contrary to expectation, the United States should sub- 
mit to it. 

A belligerent, affected by the aggressions of its ene- 
my on neutrals, has a right to expect information of 
the me isurcs those neutrals will take to maintain their 
neutrality. If then, in point of fact, the application of 
the Berlin decree to the United States had been doubt* 
ful, it would have comported Vvith that fairness of con- 
duct which a neutral, under such circumstances, ought 
to observe, to give Great Britain express assurances, 
that the United States would not acquiesce in, but 
would resist so (laOTunt a violation of their rights. No 
such assurances appear to have been ever given. On 
the contrary, our government continued to manifest, 
both in its language and conduct, the most decided 
rigour to England, and partiality to France. In the 
mean time, the Berlin decree was executed abroad, 
and by openly obtioning certificates of origin from the 
French consuls, it was practically submitted to at 
home ; nor did our government in any manner dis- 
countenance this practice. 

Sucii was the state of facts in November 1807, when 
tlic British orders of council were issued. 

After they w^re published, but before they wefe 
know 11 in America, the embargo was imposed. This 



89 

measure, therefore, in its origin, had no reference t^ 
those orders. It was predicatipd on the previous state 
of things, and would have been adopted had they never 
existed. 

What secret communications may have been made 
by any of the belHgerent cabinets to our administra- 
tion, I pretend not to conjecture ; but the state of 
things on which this measure was in fact predicated^ 
was this — 

The emperor of France had openly assumed the de- 
termination to prohibit all trade w ith the British do- 
minions, or in articles of the growth or manufacture 
of those dominions. He had compelled the reluctant 
and vassal states of h urope, to enter into a league for 
the execution of this system, so prejudicial to them- 
selves. He had declared it to be the common interest 
of the commercial uorld, and that all ought to unite in 
it. lie had issued an edict, enjoining this course on 
all neutral powers, and subjecting to confiscation the 
property of all those who should dare to disobey his 
mandate. 

Some doubt having been entertained, whether this 
imperial edict extended to America, his majesty was 
consulted on the subject, and declared, that it did.— - 
This communication being received, the embargo was 
instantly adojjted. 

I will not hazard a conjecture on the motives, which 
might lead to this measure ; but, without fear of con-- 
tradiction, I venture to say, that national honour is not 
to be found among them. 

A FARMER, 



M 



NO. V. 

It being; apparent that a sense of national honour 
contribu^^ed in no cle«free to the adoption of the emb <.r- 
go, it remains to enquire, whether that noble and ele- 
vated sentiment demands its continuance. Those who 
maintain the affirmative of this question, must do so oh 
one of two grounds. They must either contend, that 
a system once adopted, can never be reUnnuished with- 
out disgrace, ho\\^cver certain the ruin it involves ; or, 
that subsequent events have so changed the original 
character of the measure, that perseverance in it, to 
our destruction, is now exacted by national honour. 

To the observations made in a preceding number on 
the first part of this proposition, 1 will only add, that 
a nation, which has entered into engcigements with 
others, for the attainment of a common object, may 
feel itself bound by tliose engagements, to persevere in 
measures extremely onerous to itself, so long as that 
perseverance is required by its ally. But a nation act- 
ing singly, and unconnected with others, can never 
feel an honorary obligation to adhere to a system obvi- 
ously inefficacious, and leading iniallibly to ruin, 
merely because that system has been adopted. 
I pass to the second part of the proposition. 
The events whicli have either come to our kno\A'ledge 
or have occurred since the imposition of the embargo, 
and v/hich can influence its continuance, are the orders 
of tlie British council, the various edicts of the French 
emperor, the diplomatic communications of this coun- 
try with the belligerents, and the revolutions in Spain 
and Portugal. 

The orders of council commence with retaliating 
strictly on France the principle of the Berlin decree. 
But from the rigour of this rule thei'e are several ex. 
ceptions. One of great importance is, that tlic direct 
trade between the United States and tiic colonies of the 
enemy is left open. Another, that vessels destined for 
France, after the knowledge of this blockading decree, 
;u-e not to be captured and confiscated, but to be v/arn- 
cd to sail for a British port. Connected with this latter 
exception, is another, which, far from beins; considered 



SI 

as a mitigation of the rigour of the rule, has been treat- 
ed as its mo'ot obnoxious fedtLire. Tnis is the admis- 
sion of the voyage to France after entering a British 
port, subject to the condition of receiving a licence from 
the government, which, in some instances, is only- 
granted on the payment of a transit duly. This has 
been denominated "tribute," and being artfully consi- 
dered as an independent measure, has been represented 
to the American people by their rulers with so much 
exaggeration, that the encrmities of France arc redu- 
ced in their estimation to petty indiscretions. 

In noticing this regulation, I do not mean to justify 
it, as it stands connected with that Vvhich first compels 
the American vessel to enter a British port. On the 
contrary, I concur in the policy, making it penal for 
vessels, under such circumstances, to sail with these 
licences. Great Britain has certainl} a right to impose 
what export duty she pleases, but not to compel foreign 
vessels to enter her ports, and thereby become liable to 
that duty. Yet this subject, like every olher, ought to 
be fairly understood by a nation, which is to make it , 
the foundation of measures extremely interesting to 
itself. 

If a port be actually blockaded, so as to give a right 
to prohibit the entry of neutrals, no relaxation of this 
prohibition would be oflensive. If a vessel should be 
allowed to enter, on paying all the value of her cargo, 
her owner might, at his discretion, accept or reject the 
terms, and his nation would not feel itself concerned in. 
his making or declining the contract. The only ques- 
tion in which his government could interfere, would 
respect the legitimacy of the prohibition. Admit this, 
and any terms of relaxation would be exclusively for 
the consideration of the neutral navigator to whom they 
were proposed. 

So with respect to the orders under consideration. 
If the principle of retaliation, which Great Britain has 
assumed, be admissible, a rigorous adherence 'to that 
principle in its full extent, would leave no other distinc- 
tion between her and France, than may be drawn from 
the difference which might exist in the manner and 
temper with which each applied the principle, and from 



92 

the circumstance that the latter has voluntarily origina-^ 
ted ihe system, while the former has entered into itj 
long after her adversary, and with professions of muchl 
reluctance. 

Even under this view of the subject, the quaHficationl 
of the rule cannot justly render it more offensive. 'lo\ 
warn a vessel bound for France to enter a British port,,] 
cannot be more objectionable than to capture or burnfj 
that vessel ; nor can the ofter of an election to sell the f 
cargo in Great Britain, or to transmit it under a British 
licence to France, be more injurious than to conhscatCj 
that cargo. 

With respect to the duty, it is vrorthy of remark, thati 
much solicitude was manifested by the British cabinet, 
to discoxer whether a total prohibition of the importa- , 
tion iiito France of certain a tides on wJ:iieh it is impo- 
sed, or their admission burdened with a transit duty, 
would be least ofFensiA^e to the United States. Our 
minister having very properly refused to indicate any 
opinion on the point, it was determined to give the 
ownt r liis election. This was particularly the case on 
imposing the duty on cotton. 

\\ ithout hesitating for an instant in concurring with' 
the government of my country, in the adoption of pro- 
per measures to prevent the payment ofthisdutyby 
vessels compelled to enter a British port, truth requires 
a fair statement of the moti\es which induced the im- 
positi n of it. 

The deciees of France not only prohibit the intro- 
duction of this, and of a,i other articles into England, 
but constitute a complete and u: precedented system of 
war on all English manufactures. Nothing would give 
such effect to this system, as the substitution of L'oods 
made on the con'inent in the iia:e of those heretofore 
imported from England. In re, eliing this system, 
therefo e. Great Br. tain may be expected to direct her 
power, in a })articular manner, to the prevention of the 
ability to make ihij substitution. Either the principle 
of retaliation would be entirely abandoned, or would be 
applied with peculiar watchfullness to those raw mate- 
rials, wh/ich might nourish rival manufactories. Of 
these, cotton is among the most essential 



93 

The orders of council then, even if unauthorised by 
the previous conduct of France, are much less injurious 
to the United States than the Berlin decree. If they 
are authorised by that conduct, all the evils resulting 
from them, are to be ascribed exclusively to France. 
Without determining the question of right,' any mode- 
rate and reasonable man must admit, that it is at least 
involved in so much doubt, as not to exclude negoci- 
ation, but to constitute a fair subject for amicable and 
honourable compromise. 

Whether they derive extenuation ft'om the circum- 
stances which gave birth to them, or admit of no palli- 
ation, they constitute the sum of British offence. 

France has added to her original aggression, the two 
decrees of Milan and Bayonne. Tiiese subject to cap- 
ture and condemnation every American vessel which 
shall even be visited by a British cruiser, although 
bound for France, and laden with a cargo the produce 
of the United States. They consequently subject to 
capture and condemnation, every American vessel 
which swims the ocean. They also sequester all the 
property v»hich American citizens have trusted into 
France under the relations of peace and the faith of 
treaties. 

In the execution of these decrees, means the most 
hostile and the most unjustifiable have been emplo} ed, 
and practices the most ferocious have been indulged 
with impunity. Their sea-rovers liave been permitted, 
without censure, to disregard those forms, the observ- 
ance of which, for the purpose of humanity, the civili- 
zed world requires from enemies, and to burn those 
vessels which they meet on the high seas. Our unof- 
fending citizens too, are treated with a severity, which 
w^ar itself would scarcely justify. 

These measures are in exact conformity with the de- 
portment of the French government, in its diplomatic 
intercourse with that of the United States. His im[)e- 
rial majesty undertakes to decide on our most momen- 
tous concerns, and to determine for us the important 
question of peace and war. Anticipating tlie timevrhen 
we -shall acknowledge his right to relieve us from the 
burden of self-gov rnment, he already charges hirriself 
with the guidance of the nation. 



94 

In a letter to general Armstrong, dated the Sitli of 
November, 1807, Mr. Champagu}^, speaking ot the 
complaints which had been preferred in consequence of 
the execution of the Berhn decree, on the prop rty of 
American citizens, avows in terms, the object of that 
measure. He says, " All the difficulties which have 
" given rise to your reclamations, sir, would be remo- 
*'• ved with ease, if the government of the United States, 
*' after complaining in vain of the injustice and viola" 
*' tions of England, iook with tlie whole continent the 
* ' part of guaranteeing itself therefrom. ' ' 

Thus it is confessed, that to compel the United 
States to join that coalition against Knglish commerce, 
which had been forced upon the continent of Europe, 
was one of the motives for the decree of Berlin. 

In a subsequent letter, Mr. Champagny discloses un- 
equivocally, the very interesting fact, that the property 
oi our injured fellow citizens was sequestered in France 
for the purpose of forcing the United States into a war 
wirli Great Britain, and that its confiscation or release, 
depended on the measures they should adopt for ma- 
king a common cause with the continent of Europe. — 
The embargo has been considered as a pledge, that we 
are engaged in that common cause ; yet the sequestra- 
tion is continued, to secure our future fidelity and obe- 
dience. 

The resolution of Bonaparte to force us into the war, 
is unquestionably demonstrated by other testimony, 
not yet in possession of the public. In a debate op fo- 
reign relations, Mr. Masters, an independent and in- 
telligent democratic member, said, "It was the dcter- 
" mination of the emperor to compel us to take part in the 
" ix'-r/r, ciilier as friends or allies. If the nation does 
" not know this, I know it, andyouknowit, Mr. Chairman, 
' ' The demands arepositi'De; andhe cause we haije not prompt' 
" ly obeyed y France has swept, by sequestration and confis- 
" cation, all the American property from lialy to Antwerp^ 
" amounting to more than one hundred millions ofUvres.''^ 

I forbear to give vent to the feelings which such in- 
dignities and injuries must excite in the bosom of every 
real American. Prudence, perhaps, requires their 
suppression. 



95 

After tills disclosure, a disclosure the truth of which 
is but too well supported by the testimony in possession 
of the public, who, without unspeakable niortification, 
can read that part of the speech of the same gentleman, 
which developes the motives for continuing the embar- 
go, and for the last messages to Europe ? 

Th.e measures of France and Great Britain having 
been reviewed, the propositions we have made to them 
• will now receive a brief consideration. 

That made to France is not completely understood. 
The instructions to our minister in Paris are not pui:>- 
lished ; and their purport is not to be collected from his 
letters, since he did not dare to address an official note 
to the French government, on receiving them, propo- 
sing a repeal of the Berlin decree as a motive for remov- 
ing the embargo ; and the president is too vague in his 
message to congress to give any precise id-ea on the sub- 
ject. If Vv'e may reason from general Armstrong's let- 
ter of the 6di of August, 1808, we are led irresistibly 
to the conckision,* [that if France rescinded the Berlin 
decrees, war would be declared against Great Britain,] 
should that power not yield every point demanded by 
the United States, formed a part of the proposition. — - 
The message of the president at the ommencemeiit of 
the session, and the debates in congress, countenance 
this opinion. 

Over the proposition to England, the same veil of 
mystery is not drawn. To that power nodiing further 
was ofiered, th n a suspension of the embargo with re- 
gard to her, provided\she would previously revoke her 
orders of council. 

It is said that this offer took from Great Britain 
every pretext for continuing her orders, and that its 
failure demonstrates the hostile temper of that nation. — - 
While we acquiesce with respectful silence in an adhe- 
rence to her system on the part of France, so superci- 
lious and determined, that our minister could not ven- 
ture even to make to his imperial majesty the proposi- 
tion transmitted by our government, the United States 
resound with preparations for war, because England has 
not accepted the lerms our president has deigned to 
offer her. 

J^'ote. — Merc is an hiatus in the original manuscript, supplied 
by the editw. 



96 

Let this subject be seriously ( ximined. 

Tne orders oi' council were iio> occasioned by the ein«= 
barp-o. I'hcv were not intended as a measure of reta- 
liation against the United Status, but against France. 
Their publication was accompanied Vvith the declara- 
tion, that tliey should be co^existent with the French 
decrees, and should be revoked the instant those de- 
crees were revoked. 

Tiiese decrees not having been adopted in conse- 
quence of the embargo, their dependence on it, or con- 
nection with it, is not distinctly perceived ; nor does 
its repeal appear to furnibh a motive for dieir revocation, 
unless that measure would amount to an eitectual resis- 
tance to that invasion of neutral rights, which they were 
intended to retaliate. 

Our rulers have assumed the fact, that the removal of 
the embargo as respects England, v»4ule it continued 
with regard to France, would constitute resistance to 
the edicts of the latter power. 

This conclusion does not appear to be correct. The 
embargo would neither authorise nor enable a single 
American vessel on a voyage to or from the dominions 
of Great br;tain to resist a French cruiser, who should 
Ciipture her on that account. Our trade with those do- 
minions would consecpiently remain, as heretofore, sub- 
ject io the full operation of the French decrees, whie 
the rev(jcation of the orders of council would leave our 
trade to France unm( lestcd. 

l>ut a continuance of tlie embargo with respect to 
France, it is said, would divert our whole trade from 
that nation still more eficctually than the orders of coun- 
cil, and would consequently render those orders useless. 

In examining this assertion, i waive ail doubt respect- 
iiig the good faith with v*'hich any stipulation prohibit- 
ing trade with France would be executed. 

With whatever suspicions the open partiality of our 
:idn>ir;istn'.tion for one of the belligerents might justly in- 
sj^ire the other, i will not presume that the nation would 
,i:ct v/iih unfluiness. Yet no delicacy resu'ains me from 
Sii}ihg, thr.t the prohli)iiion might be easily evaded. — » 
Vessels clearing out for Spanish or Portuguese ports 
on ■Jr.- Tjiv of Bisc-iy. or for Enghsh ports on the 



^7 

diannel, eould find their way, without much difficulty, 
into the adjacent ports of France. Should an English 
cruiser discover them in the fact of entering such port, 
it would not be lawful to capture them ; for capture in 
such case, would be equivalent to a reinstatement of the 
orders of council. And, although we ake no umbrage 
at supplements being added to our embargo laws by 
France, for the purpose of condemning vessels not 
comprehended within them, we should not brook on 
the part of England, the capture of a vessel taken in the 
fact of violating both their letter and their spirit. 

That our administration is itself perfctly persuaded 
of the futility of any attempt, to prevent articles once 
trusted to the open sea, from reaching a port whe!e 
they are in great demand, is fairly admitted in the ar- 
gument for continuing the embargo. The friends of 
that measure contend, that a permission to export our 
provisions and raw materials, even to those countries 
which respect our rights, would destroy its coercive 
properties, because those articles would inf Uihly be 
conveyed to Great Britain. No man can doubt the in-* 
competency of regulations made in the United States, 
not enforced by a navy, effectually to restrain vessels 
navigatmg the high seas. Not even the present arbi- 
trary system of Bonaparte, would amount to a total eX' 
elusion of American vessels from his ports. Favourites 
would be licensed, and would prosecute the trade with 
immense profit. 

The proposition made to Great Britain then, contain- 
ed nothing like resistance to the French decrees. Nor 
did it afford any security, that the trade to France would 
not be prosecuted to as great an extent as the emperur 
would tolerate ; consequently, it presented a state of 
things, not essentially variant from that which existed 
when the retaliating system was adopted. 

This is not all. Nothing more completely assures 
an amicable adjustment of differences, than an amicable 
disposition. Terms offered by a government, whose 
dispositions are really friendly, will be much less rigid- 
ly scrutinized, than when offered by a power, whose 
unfriendly temper mingles itself with all its transactions. 

N 



98 

1 do not mean to say, that our negotiations with Eng- 
land, to be successful, ought to man fest for Great Bri- 
tain that partiality, which characterises ournegociations 
with France ; but that they ought to be undertaken in 
the true spirit of conciliation, and conducted in that 
frank and honourable temper, which distinguished the 
negotiations of Washington and Adams. So far 
from this, the proposition did not even exhibit a temper 
liiendly to accommodation. It manifested no inclina- 
tion to suspend a coercive course, which America has 
for some time pursued. The non-intercourse law, 
that fn-st step in the path marked out by French enmity 
to British commerce, and the proclamation, by which 
our ports were closed against British armed ships, while 
tliey remained open to those of her enemy, were both 
to continue in foi^cc ; our government did not even in- 
binuate, that this hostile system might possibly be dis- 
continued in the event of the removal of the orders of 
council. 

\\^hat then is the amount of the proposition, the re- 
jection of which is said to render war inevitable ? It 
is, that if Great Britain will abandon the principle of 
retorting on France die injuries which his imperial ma- 
jesty seeks to inflict, by violating the law of nations on 
the subject of neutral commerce, we will open our ports 
and resume our trade, except that no vessel shall clear 
out for France — that those commercial restrictions, 
^\hich were imposed for the purpose of humbling Eng- 
land, shall still remain ; and that our ports will still ma- 
nifest our partiality to her enemy. 

Could it have been expected, that such a proposition 
would be successful ? The English government re- 
ceives daily proofs of the interminable animosity of our 
administration. The embargo itself is among the 
strong evidences of this sentiment. Having been im- 
posed when the orders of council Mere unknown, it 
shows what congress would have done, had those orders 
jiever existed. It shews, diat when commanded by 
France to suspend our commerce with Britain, and 
compelled by premature outrages to inten-upt for a time 
its course with France, we will suspend it with all the 
\\ orld, to our o^n ruin, rather than allow Britain to 
participate in its advantages. With the recollection of 



99 

this fact, and of others not less decisive, how could 
such a proposition be understood ? Without insinu^ 
ating that the suspicion would be correct, I may say, 
that the British cabinet would not be inexcusable, for 
suspecting that the proposition was entirely insincere ; 
that it was made for the purpose of being rejected ; and 
of being used, as it has been used, as a mean of further 
exasperating the American people, and of impelling 
them into that war, which Bonaparte enjoins, and to 
which their rulers so incessantly urge them. 

The experiment, I fear, will never be made ; but 
there is every reason to believe, that a temper truly con- 
ciliatory on our part, would soon terminate honourably 
and advantageously, the differences between this coun- 
try and Great Britain. Certainly the reverse of that 
temper has thus far been uniformly displayed. 

J FARMER. 



100 

NO. VL 

The conduct of France and Great Britain towards 
the United States, has now been examined with candor, 
and with as much detail as the limits necessarily pre- 
scribed for news-paper essays will admit. 

The result is this — 

That war upon neutral commerce, which violates too 
outrageously the sovereignty and rights of neutrals, to 
find a single open apologist, and to which our rulers 
ascribe those measures which have occasioned all our 
embarrassments, originated in the Berlin decree : The 
terms of that^pdict, unequivocally comprehend the Uni- 
ted States. It was immediately carried into execution, 
by seizing the property of their citizens in neutral ports, 
and hy captures made on the high seas. At the in- 
stance of her emperor, similar edicts were issued by his 
dependent governments, under which the vessels of the 
United States were captured and condemned. No sa- 
tisfactory explanation of this decree was ever given, 
and none was received from authority, until near twelve 
months after its date, when the emperor, returning 
victorious from the war on the Vistula, declared that, as 
the decree itself contained no exception in favour of any 
nation, none could be made in its execution. 

During this time, the United States, far from mani- 
festing any disposition to resist this flagrant invasion of 
their rights, gave no evidence of uneasiness at it. — ■ 
Their resentments were directed exclusively against the 
nation this measure was intended to crush. 
^ The thrust which wounded neutrals, was professedly 
aimed at Great Britain, and must, if not parried, reach 
lier through them. Her determination to retaliate it, 
was immediately declared, and the United States were 
solicited in friendly and respectful terms, to render this 
retaliation through them unnecessary, by resisting, 
thrmselves, this unprecedented attack on their sove- 
reignty. 'J'hese solicitations being unavailing, orders 
•were issued soon after the declaration of the emperor, 
which placed France and her allies in a state of blockade. 
These orders contain exceptions, which tolerate an ex- 



101 

tensive neutral trade, prohibited by the decree they pro- 
fess to letaliate. 

This measure was the signal for others on the part of 
France, which, among many atrocities, subject to cap- 
ture and condemnaton every American vessel that has 
been visited by a British cruiser. Should the vessel so 
visited be even laden with American produce, and be 
bound to a French port, she will derive no protection 
from those circumstances. 

When it is recollected, that British cruisers cover the 
ocean, and that the right of a belligerent to visit all mer- 
chantmen is unquestionable, is one which the mercliant 
has neither the right nor the power to resist, this is 
equivalent to an order for the condemnation of every 
American vessel which navigates the ocean, if found 
either on the high seas or in a port under the controul 
of France. 

That France, in the very act of condemning Ameri- 
can vessels for being visited by British cruisers, exer- 
cises herself the right inhibited to others, would be 
worthy of notice, were it not that her whole conduct, 
with respect to the liberty of the seas, is in such diicct 
opposition to her professions, exhibits such an uniform 
course of violence and tyranny, that we are surprised at 
no contradictipn, however palpable — at no atrocit} , how- 
ever enormous. 

If an outrage like this, could be aggravated by any 
circumstances whatever, those circumstances may be 
found in the manner in which it has been executed, and 
in the accompanying declarations of the j^overnment, 
from which it proceeds. Our vessels are burnt upon, 
the high seas — our sailors imprisoned as enemies — our 
property, trusted to their country under the faith of 
treaties, is sequestered to secure our future obedience — ^ 
our nation is transferred in secret treaty- — and v\ e are 
ordered to enter into a war, the object of which is, the 
extermination of liberty ! 

Could the feelings, which these enormities must ex- 
cite in the bosom of every American patriot, be render- 
ed still more pungent, that effect would be produced 
by the reflection, that they proceed from a government, 
whpse friendship the United States have uniformly 



102 

courted, with an assiduity often approaching to mean- 
ness, and whose forbearance they have long sought to 
purchase, by sacrifices extremely burdensome and dan- 
gerous to themselves 

Against which of these powers would national honor 
direct the energies of the United States ? 

To an American statesman, guiding at this crisis the 
councils of his country, it cannot be unimportant, that, 
by co-operating with France, our exertions will be em- 
ployed in effecting the subjugation of the world, and of 
ourselves. By pursuing the opposite course, we con- 
tribute to preserve what yet remains of independence 
for other nations, and to secure our own. By entering 
into the views of Bonaparte, Ave are riveting the chains 
of those whom he has already bound, and preparing 
fetters for ourselves, as well as for others who yet re- 
main free. By counteracting those views, we take the 
last chance for retaining on our earth a single vestige of 
national or individual liberty. 

But 1 forbear to urge this consideration, because my 
enquiry is not, what does national safety demand, but 
w hat does national honour exact ? Ca:n national honor 
exact a co-operation with that power which has started 
first, and has so greatly outstripped its adversary in this 
flagitious course of injustice ? Which, in its diplomatic^ 
intercourse, adopts the language, not of a sovereigr'^ 
treating with a sovereign, but of a superior dictating tc 
an inferior ? Which commands us to make war, anc • 
seizes our property to enforce obedience ? Whose, 
known object is the subjugation of the world ? 

To those, who seek to diminish the odium, which, ir 
the minds of independent and unprejudiced men, mus 
be attached to our present system, by suggesting that i^ 
is equal resistance to all the belligerents, the answer i; 
obvious. The belligerents are not equal offenders 
The one has voluntarily attacked us ; the other has en 
tered into the disagreeable contest reluctantly, and ii 
self defence. The one has carried her outrages to thi 
utmost of her po^ver ; the other, with much more abilit; 
for immediate injury, has limited her retaliation to mea 
surcs much less violent than those adopted by her ad 
versary. The one declares her determination to adher 



103 

to her system until she shall establish principles, which 
will totally change the law of nations, and commands us 
to unite with her in establishing those principles by 
'force ; the other, declares her determination to abandon 
the system so soon as her enemy shall cease to use it as 
an instrument of war ; and only asks us to take measures, 
which shall prevent its operating on ourselves to her 
prejudice. 

But, above all, it is not equal resistance to both bel- 
ligerents. 

It has been already said, that the power and resources 
of Great Britain depend on commerce. To destroy 
her commerce, although that of P' ranee must be sus- 
pended by the attempt, is the openly avowed object of 
the tyrant, at v/hose frown the world trembles. To 
this object his whole system is directed, and he has 
compelled all those over whom his power extends, to 
adopt it. In terms not to be misunderstood, he has 
commanded the United Sta-es to enter into it ; and, to 
coerce obedience, has not held the rod suspended over 
us, he has scourged us with it. The embargo is con- 
sidered by him as entering into this coalition, and in 
his expose he ranks us with his vassal neighbours — but 
the rod is not yet laid aside. Further and more deci- 
sive measures must be adopted. 

It is then apparent, that this whole work of self-de- 
struction ; this whole system of annihilating commerce, 
whether it takes the form of embargo, non- intercourse, 
or war, is indeed hostility to England, but is co-opera- 
tion with France. It is a co operation, entered into un- 
der the influence of menace and of punishment. 

Does national honour demand this ruinous sacrifice ? 
Nay, more, can national honour endure it ? The train 
of reasoning which can lead to this opinion, is as diiiicult 
to conceive, as it is unworthy of refutation. To a really 
independent American, it must be clear as the sun at 
mid-day, that no course can be more humiliating, none 
more degrading to the nation, than that we are pursuing. 
It is the system which France has prescribed, and our 
rulers leave no hope of its terminating. On the floor of 
coi-^ress, the declaration is unreservedly made, that it 
must be pursued to the extremity of war. War alone 



104 

can dci>Tacle us still lower, by carrying our obedience 
still lurLher than the abandonment of commerce has 
carried it. 

1 shall not trespass on the patience of the public, by 
many remarks on the influence, which the revolutions 
in Spain and Portaj^al ought to have on our conduct. 
The time has been, when every American bosom would 
have kindled into a sympathetic flame, in favour of a 
nalion s ruggling to preserve its freedom against treach- 
ery and violence ; but that time is past, never I fear to 
return. That love of liberty, which once glowed in our 
bosoms, is extinguished by our hate of England, or 
chilled by the terror, which Bonaparte inspires^ That 
hate of despotism, for which we were once distinguish- 
ed, ceases when Bonaparte is the despot. The victo- 
ries of liberty afflict us, when they are obtained over the 
m}rmidoms of Bonaparte, or when the cause of free- 
dom is upheld by Britain or her allies, our character 
seems radically changed. 

To withliold from Spain and Portugal, struggling 
against despotism in its most odious form, those im- 
portant supplies, with which a free commerce would 
furnish them, is not only unnecessarily injurious to our- 
selves, but is aiding the cause of tyrants. To divest 
ourselves of the common right of pursuing our ordinary 
commercial intercourse with nations under such cir- 
cumstances, is not only an abandonment of national in- 
terest, but a dereliction of national character and of 
national honour. It will long be remembered, by those 
who feel its hostility and discern its motive, and will, 
I fear, open to us "an Iliad of woes." — I forbear to 
press this subject further. 

By those who have plunged their countr}^ into these 
calamities, and who are burying the recollection of the 
past under still more afiiicting ruin, it is asked, what 
other course could have been taken, and what other 
course can now be taken ? 

We may look back to the past for instruction, how to 
avoid future errors. The course which ought to have 
been taken, is that which was prescribed by national 
honour and by national interest. It is that which was 
honourably and successfully pursued, under similar cir- 



feiiriistanccs, in 1793. Instead cf fomenting clit-ferences 
\^'ith a power, whose dispositions v. ere friendly, by de- 
liianding pertinaciously tiie concession of principles? 
■whicii that power dares not yield, and of endeavouring 
to pave the U'ay for hostilities by non-intercourse laws 
and proclamations, we ought, on the publication of the 
Berhn decree, to have taken the manly ground of a truly 
independent nation. We ought instantly to have assert- 
ed our rights iirmly, and with moderation, by a judi- 
cious use of the best means w^e had^the povv er to em- 
ploy. We ought openly to have declared our determi-- 
nation to resist the execution of that decree, and we 
ought to have prepared to resist it. Nothing short of an 
explicit declaration from authority, that its provisions, 
though so expressed as' to comprehend all neutrals, 
should not comprehend the United States, ought to 
have restrained our government from arming, and from 
authorising our merchant vessels to arm for the protec- 
tion of commerce. This course was exacted by na- 
tional honour, and had it been pursued, we should have 
escaped both disgrace and ruin. We should never 
have been embarrassed by the retaliating orders of Bri- 
tain, or by our ouii embargo and non-intercourse ex- 
periments. The letter of Mr. Decres ought not to have; 
beguiled us for an instant, from this plain path. That 
letter could never have deceived a government which 
did not court deception. The decree itself, and the 
manner in which it was executed at 1 -amburgh and 
elsewhere, spoke a language too plain and intelligible^ 
to have been obscured by the evasive conjectures of 
Mr. Decres, had we not carefully shunned the light, 
and anxiously sought a bandage for ourov.n eyes. 

But if our own solicitude to obviate the resentynentr, 
of Bonaparte, might apc^logize for not making immedi^ 
ate resistance ; if it might even excuse our tame acqui- 
escence in his withholding from November 1806 till 
October 1807, not only that voluntary communication 
on so interesting a subject, which decent respect ft>r a 
:aeutral and friendly power required, but any ansMcr to 
the applications we must have made in the mean time, 
for a favourable interpretation of his decree, what can 
be said to palliate thedisG;racerul and ruinoasstcp which 
we took when his decision reached us ? 



10(3 

Oil receiving the oflicial declaration of the emperor, 
ihat his decree contained no exci.],tion in favour of the 
United States, and that, consequently, none could be 
made in its execution, ought a doubt to have remained 
respecting' the line of conduct, which America was 
bound by the high obligations oi national honour and 
national independence to adopt ? Between resistance 
and submission, the nation had to elect- Our govern- 
ment chose the latte^. Instead of arming to defend our 
commerce, our rulers surrendered it. They obe}ed as 
f;>r as they could obey, the mandate of his imperial ma- 
jesty. They took the first step tOM ards stopping our 
trade vv'i^h England. T he suspension of our trade with 
France also, was inevitab y the eonseqi;ence of arresting 
our commerce with En gland. It could not have been pro- 
secuted without great danger, and v. ith the facts then in 
pcssession of our rulers, such a naked act ol obedience, 
I ad they even been inciii.ed to it, would hiive been a sur- 
render of inde]endence too undisguised to be safe. 

Let it be recollected, that, at this time, the retaliating 
orders of Britain were unknov.nto us, ardj consequent- 
ly, our conduct v/as the sam.e, and ought to have been 
the same, as if those orders had never existed. In such 
a state of things, instead of adopting a system which 
conformed to the imperious mandate of Napoleon ; which 
wore the aspect of obedience ; which has bee treated 
in congress as a measure intended to coerce Great Bri- 
tair., rather than France ; and which has been considered 
by the emperor as partially making common cause with 
the continent of Europe, we ought to have made a firm 
stand in defence of rights, which we could only sur- 
render with our independence, and have directed our 
resistance exclusively against the invader of them. 

Mild we tlien armed for self-protection, how different 
would have been our present situation. It may be safely 
afiirmed, that on receiving information of this fact, 
li>ritain would instantly have revoked her orders of coun- 
cil. When it is recollected, that she jidopted these or- 
dri-s simply as a measure of retaliation on France, Vvhich 
slic justified by otir non-resistance of the Berlin decree, 
it M il! not b.e denied, that Me might, v ithout Joss of re- 
putation, have suspended hostilities agiiinst her, until 



107 

she could act with a knowledge of our resistance ; or 
we might have imposed an embargo, to continue until 
her conduct should deteniiine ours. The most punc- 
tilious honour M'ould not have felt itself wounded by 
this procedure, because our measures of resistance to 
the invasion of our independence by France, having 
been taken without knowledge of the retaliating orders 
of England, would have been exempt from the suspi- 
cion of being influenced by those orders. Nor would 
there have been any difficulty in reveling any measure 
of precaution or resistance, which we might have 
adopted, when the order on Vvhich such measure had 
been founded was revoked. 

So plain a path could never ha^•e been mistaken, had 
we not unfortunately selected for our guides the blind- 
est passions and the most inveterate prejudices. But 
the important and more intricate question is, v.'hat mea- 
sures ought now to be adopted ? 

Easy as it Vv-as to escape the distressing embarrass<. 
ments into v/hich our rulers have plunged the nation, 
it is not easy to extricate ourselves from them. The 
course, however, thoogh difficult, is not impracticable. 
To perceive distinctly the error we have committed, is 
doing much towards correcting that error. Our first 
false step, was that long acquiescence in the Berlin de- 
cree, which preceded the declaration made by the em- 
peror in the autumn of 1807. A second, and still less 
excusable error, was, that when we did act, our mea- 
sures wore the aspect of submission to that decree, 
rather than of resistance to it. 

It is by the abandonment of error, not b}?- a perseve- 
rance in it, that its most mischievous consequences are 
to be obviated. If a conduct, the reverse of that which 
we have pursued, would have saved us from our present 
ruinous embarrassments, reversing that conduct even 
now, affords the fairest prospect of relieving us from the 
worst consequences of those embarrassments. 

The question whether our acquiescence in the Berlin 
decree, was such as to justify the retaliating orders of 
Britain, is one which can never be decided. It is one, 
on which the two nations can never be expected to con- 
cur in sentiment. But m this all reasonable men will 



108 

concur : Our ^vliolc conduct' was oi' a character to fur- 
nish the British cabinet \v\lh such grounds for the opi- 
nion on \\hich they acted ; the motives to which that 
nation ascribes her conduct are such ; such is the evi- 
dence which supports those motives ; and such her 
situation in the war, that, without being over credulous, 
wc may beUeve that her measures are not dictated by a 
temper unfriendly tothe United Stdtes, or dangerous to 
our independence, but b}' that real necessity, which 
surrounding dangi|i-s and the previous violence of her 
eneui}' have created. She h 'S not of choice adopted 
that system, to which we ascribe our abandonment of 
the ocean. It is the sj^'stem of France, and France ex- 
acts from us an active observance of it. 

Under these circumstances, our differences with Bri- 
tain present a case for fair and honourable negotiation. 
Would our rulers enter into that negotiation in the true 
spirit of conciliation, it could not fail to prove success- 
ful. If upon the removal of the orders of council, we 
would do that Avhich our interests, our honour, our in- 
dependcnce, imperiously demanded, before these orders 
were known to us— -resist eirectually the attack on that 
independence, which Xapoleon has made, no doubt can 
be entertained, but that these orders would be removed. 

This true spirit of conciliation has never been dis- 
played in any negotiation between our administration 
and England. On the contrary, our conduct has uni- 
Ibrmly manifested oiu- fears, that the restoration of ami- 
cable intercourse wilh that nation, would be the signal 
ibr Avar from France. If we continue to act on the 
same principles, that war which the emperor commands 
us to wage cannot be remote; and our old men, who 
\ now ^^ itness our dishonour, may live to see us, in re- 

gular gradation, the allies, the vassals, and the subjects 
ol 1' ranee — may live to see our liberties extinguisfi- 
c d , and o ur i n d e r e n d e n c e lost I 

J FARMER, 



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